In this essay, Dennett presents a thought experiment in which he is charged with the task of dismantling a nuclear device. Because the device emits radiation that would severely damage the brain of anybody nearby, scientists remove Dennett's brain and place it into a vat in Texas, where it is connected to a number of radio transmitters and receivers that connect to transmitters and receivers in Dennett's body. Dennett, justifiably confused about whether he should identify with his body or brain, proceeds to name his brain, "Yorick" and his body, "Hamlet."
Dennett then discusses the legal liabilities that may follow from this setup:
Suppose, I argued to myself, I were now to fly to California, rob a bank, and be apprehended. In which state would I be tried: in California, where the robbery took place, or in Texas, where the brains of the outfit were located? Would I be a California felon with an out-of-state brain, or a Texas felon remotely controlling an accomplice of sorts in California? It seemed possible that I might beat such a rap just on the undecidability of that jurisdictional question, though perhaps it would be deemed an interstate, and hence Federal, offense.
I am no expert on determining state jurisdiction over criminal actions, although I think that the different states would not have a problem concluding that Dennett was present. I am thinking of a logic similar to the approach employed by the Court in Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912) where the Court found that a defendant was constructively present in Washington DC because the events of a conspiracy involving the defendant were carried out in DC at a certain time. Certainly the question would be much easier in a tort context, as the tort would have occurred in California, and because it is likely that the victim is a California resident.
I doubt that Dennett's thought experiment will manifest itself when I end up practicing, but with technology developing the way it is, you never know.
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