The Third Amendment in 2020

I recently posted a working version of a short article I'm writing to SSRN. It is meant to be the first in a yearly series of articles on the Third Amendment. This article surveys how the Third Amendment was cited and referenced in 2020--from cases and Third Amendment claims by litigants, to citations in academic legal writing. It also addresses popular coverage of the Third Amendment, which was surprisingly active in 2020.

The abstract is below:

This Article is the first in a series of yearly articles analyzing references, discussion, and applications of the Third Amendment in court, legal scholarship, and popular media and commentary. The Third Amendment’s prohibition on the quartering of soldiers in houses during peacetime, and its requirement that quartering during times of war be authorized by law is not typically discussed (or even known) by most in the legal field. This Article and its future iterations aim to address this neglect by surveying references to the Third Amendment and noting trends in its invocation and discussion across all aspects of the legal field.

As it turns out, the Third Amendment had a bit of a moment in 2020, drawing brief but widespread public attention in early June. A dispute between the mayor of Washington, DC and National Guard soldiers over whether they could be housed in a particular hotel led to a great deal of speculation over whether the Third Amendment would be invoked and, if so, whether it would apply to the dispute. While no litigation ended up taking place, this incident brought more attention than usual to this neglected component of the Bill of Rights. This Article describes the dispute, surveys the commentary, and evaluates whether a Third Amendment claim could have even been made in the first place.

Beyond this, the Article surveys citations and trends in arguments invoking the Third Amendment in 2020 case law and legal scholarship. The Third Amendment’s restrictions on the practice are often cited to demonstrate a constitutional right to privacy and to substantiate claims that the Constitution and its Bill of Rights were designed to protect civilians against overbearing military and governmental authority. Additionally, it tends to be a go-to citation for litigants who claim that their rights were violated and who want to throw every argument they have at the court. This Article provides a comprehensive breakdown of Third Amendment citations in the case law, and evaluates arguments invoking the Third Amendment in 2020 legal scholarship.

While the Third Amendment doesn’t get the respect or attention given to adjacent amendments, this Article serves as a first step toward a systematic understanding of the Third Amendment’s role in case law, legal scholarship, and broader society.

I've written about the Third Amendment here several times in the past--most recently last summer. In prior years, I took a critical approach towards scholarship on the Third Amendment and evaluated whether such scholarship was worth publishing. 

Now, nearly eight years later, I think there's a place for Third Amendment scholarship. Writers should take a subtle approach and see what lessons about broader issues and practices can be drawn from patterns of Third Amendment citation and use. Stretching the Third Amendment beyond its breaking point to apply it to situations is not the way to breathe life back into the amendment--even if the argument turns out to be novel.

The article is still a draft, so any comments or feedback are welcome.

Does Quartering Troops in Hotels Implicate the Third Amendment?

With protests sweeping the nation, various cities have called on the National Guard to provide support for law enforcement officers. The District of Columbia is one such city, and among the soldiers sent to DC were National Guard Soldiers from Utah. An NPR report quotes a National Guard spokesperson, who stated that the National Guard soldiers had been quartered at the hotel and paid "government rates" for the housing.

Fast forward to today, where continued protests and criticism of the presence of troops has started to take a toll. The Salt Lake Tribune reports:

Utah National Guard soldiers and other forces from states deployed to the nation’s capital were forced out of their hotels on Friday morning in what Sen. Mike Lee called an eviction by an “ungrateful mayor.”

The mayor of the District of Columbia, Muriel Bowser, said this week that she wanted National Guard troops out of the district, which has seen days of protests — some of which have been violent — over racial injustice and the death of black Americans at police hands.

Utah’s 200 soldiers in the nation’s capital had been staying at a Marriott hotel near downtown Washington since they’re activation on Monday but were checking out Friday after being deployed to various parts of the capital city until the early morning hours.

The Utah Guard had until noon Eastern Time to depart their hotel and lodging and other accommodations were “still up in the air for this evening,” said Lee's spokesman Conn Carroll.

 Lee voiced his complaint on Twitter in the following tweets:

Just heard that Mayor Bowser is kicking the Utah National Guard out of all DC hotels tomorrow. More than 1200 troops from 10 states are being evicted. This is unacceptable. 1/2

— Mike Lee (@SenMikeLee) June 5, 2020

These brave men and women have risked their lives protecting DC for three days. Rioting, looting, arson, and vandalism have all disappeared bc these soldiers served. And now they are being kicked to the curb by an ungrateful mayor. This must be stopped. 2/2 pic.twitter.com/YYyctKvUqN

— Mike Lee (@SenMikeLee) June 5, 2020

People on Twitter were quick to respond by arguing that Lee was calling for the quartering of soldiers in hotels--a position they argued was inconsistent with the Third Amendment, which states:

No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

The Salt Lake Tribune noted this response from Lee's spokesperson to the Third Amendment issue:

Carroll said the issue has nothing to do with the Constitution’s 3rd Amendment — which prohibits forcing a homeowner to quarter troops without the owner’s consent — but a political move by Bowser.

Twitter is abuzz with debate over the issue, with some people claiming that the Third Amendment will finally get some attention, and others arguing that this sentiment is overblown. There seems to be an assumption that the officers were removed as a result of the Third Amendment being invoked by Mayor Bowser, but I have seen nothing suggesting that this is the case.

A lot of this talk is off the cuff, and bereft of case law and authority. Maybe these commentators don't realize that at least one court has addressed Third Amendment claims before. Maybe they are fair weather Third Amendment enthusiasts (unlike myself, and the National Anti-Quartering Society). Whatever the explanation may be, here is the in-depth analysis of the Third Amendment questions you were undoubtedly waiting for.

Court Finds No Third Amendment Violation After Police Occupy Home

Over at the Volokh Conspiracy, Ilya Somin writes about a recent ruling by a federal district court that police officers did not violate the Third Amendment when they entered the plaintiffs' home and stayed there for several hours while staking out the plaintiff's neighbor. The court's opinion can be found here.

The Third Amendment prohibits soldiers from being quartered in homes during times of peace without the homeowner's consent. I blogged about this particular case back when it was filed in 2013. In that post, I noted that I did not think that the lawsuit would succeed because the police officers were not "quartered" in the home. They merely stayed in the home for several hours while conducting an investigation of a neighbor.

But the district court did not even get that far, as it ruled that the Third Amendment did not apply to the officers' actions because they were not "soldiers" under the Third Amendment. While the court strongly suggested that the officers also were not quartered in the home, the court explicitly avoided answering that question.

Somin criticizes the opinion, noting that the militarization of certain police forces tends to blur the line between the police and military.

Somin also thinks that the officers may have been quartered in the home:

The issue of how long the soldiers (or militarized police) have to stay in a private home before their occupation of it qualifies as “quartering” is also a tough question. Without actually resolving the issue, Judge Gordon suspects that a 9 to 24 hour period is too short. I am not convinced. It seems to me that spending one night in the house does qualify as quartering, albeit for only a brief period. Just as the First Amendment covers even brief restrictions on freedom of speech and the Fifth Amendment requires compensation for the taking of even small amounts of private property, so the Third Amendment forbids even brief involuntary quartering of troops in private homes.

I stand by my earlier reaction to the case, and I don't think that this case involves quartering, even if the officers spent a night in the house. Officers did not spend time in the plaintiffs' home for purposes of rest or housing -- they stayed in the house in order to use it as a platform to conduct surveillance on the plaintiffs' neighbor.

As I note in this post, definitions of "quartered" typically involve one's dwelling or lodging in an area, notions that seem fundamentally different from conducting one's function as a soldier or police officer from the platform of somebody's house. Accordingly, it is not a question of how long officers are in a house, but rather a question of what they are using that house for that determines whether the officers are quartered.

Because the officers were not using the house as a dwelling or for lodging, I don't think that it is accurate to conclude that they were quartered in the house -- and I think that Somin's parallel of this case to the minimal restrictions of other rights is therefore off-point. But in light of the minimal case law on this subject, I can't bolster my claims with very much authority, so there is not much to stop courts down the road from adopting Somin's position.

Are Modern Police "Soldiers" Under the Third Amendment? And if They Are, Does it Matter?

That is the question that Sandra Eismann-Harpen raises in this comment, Rambo Cop: Is He a Soldier the Third Amendment? (41 N. Kent. L. Rev. 119 (2014)). Here is the abstract:

This Comment analyzes whether modern police fall within the meaning of soldier under the Third Amendment. It provides the historical context for the Third Amendment, and reviews the meaning of soldier within this historical context. Then, it analyzes the culture, techniques, weaponry, et cetera of modern police within the framework of the Third Amendment. Because militarized police present the same fundamental risk to American civil liberties that they posed several centuries ago, the judiciary should apply the Third Amendment to both federal and state action, and the definition of soldier under the Third Amendment should include federal, state, and local law enforcement.

For those who are not immediately familiar with the more arcane amendments, the Third Amendment states:

No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

I have seen the question raised before. Ilya Somin, spoke about this issue in discussing a case where the residents of a house where police violently gained entry to monitor a nearby home where they suspected drug activity was occurring. In his post, Somin wrote:

The most obvious obstacle to winning a Third Amendment claim here is that police arguably do not qualify as “soldiers.” On the other hand, as Radley Balko describes in his excellent new book The Rise of the Warrior Cop, many police departments are increasingly using military-style tactics and equipment, often including the aggressive use of force against innocent people who get in the way of their plans. If the plaintiffs’ complaint is accurate, this appears to be an example of that trend. In jurisdictions where the police have become increasingly militarized, perhaps the courts should treat them as “soldiers” for Third Amendment purposes.

I wrote about that case in this earlier post.

In her comment, Eismann-Harpen takes on this question beginning with a discussion of the Third Amendment claim that prompted Somin's prompt. Eismann-Harpen discusses how police tactics and equipment have evolved to mirror the military, and argues that, under an originalist understanding of the Third Amendment, modern police are much more similar to founding-era soldiers than founding-era police.

I haven't done the research on the issue, and Eismann-Harpen's discussion seems fairly thorough, but the question remains: even if police officers are "soldiers" within the meaning of the Third Amendment, does that matter? In my view, the biggest problem with Third Amendment claims arising out of police officer intrusion on homes is not that the officers aren't "soldiers," but that the officers are not "quartered" in the home.

Simple intrusion into a home does not seem to fit the modern or founding-era definitions of "to quarter." I discussed this term in an earlier post where I argued that plaintiffs should not be able to argue that military software is "quartered" in civilian computers. In that post, I was criticizing an article by Alan Butler. In that article, Butler noted that modern and founding-era definitions of "quartered" are similar:

The modern usage of the term “quarter,”—to “lodge, or dwell,”—generally matches the traditional definition of “quarter” at the time of the framing—“to lodge; to fix on a temporary dwelling.” Furthermore, the modern definition of “to lodge”—“to provide temporary quarters for” or “to establish or settle in a place”—also tracks the traditional definition of “to lodge”—”[t]o place in a temporary habitation” or “[t]o afford place to.”

I don't think that simple intrusion into the home would rise to the level of police being lodged, dwelling in, or inhabiting a home. "Quartered" seems to imply a more permanent intrusion than a simple intrusion, and the terms used to define the term imply that the person being quartered is treating the home as his or her place of residence -- which doesn't seem to fit in cases where police enter and use a home to monitor a nearby location. I would certainly agree that police in that instance have "seized" the residence, and a Fourth Amendment violation may occur, but not a Third Amendment violation.

Eismann-Harpen's comment is an interesting exploration of how modern policing has grown increasingly militarized. But as far as the Third Amendment is concerned, the "police-as-soldiers" argument is only one part of an ultimately futile Third Amendment claim.

(H/T: The Originalism Blog)

"Bah Humbug!" or: Another Paper on the Third Amendment in Cyberspace

Via Frank Pasquale's Twitter, I learned about a paper by Steven Friedland on applying the Third Amendment to government practices of mass surveillance. The title of the paper is, The Third Amendment, Privacy and Mass Surveillance. Here is the abstract:

We live in an era of mass surveillance. Advertisers, corporations and the government engage in widespread data collection and analysis, using such avenues as cell phone location information, the Internet, camera observations, and drones. As technology and analytics advance, mass surveillance opportunities continue to grow.

The growing surveillance society is not necessarily harmful or unconstitutional. The United States must track people and gather data to defend against enemies and malevolent actors. Defenses range from stopping attempts to breach government computers and software programs, to identifying and thwarting potential terroristic conduct and threats at an embryonic stage.

Yet, without lines drawn to limit mass data gathering, especially in secret, unchecked government snooping likely will continue to expand. A sitting Secretary of State even recently acknowledged that the government has “sometimes reached too far” with its surveillance. The stakes for drawing lines demarcating privacy rights and the government’s security efforts have never been higher or more uncertain.

This paper argues that the forgotten Third Amendment, long in desuetude, should be considered to harmonize and intersect with the Fourth Amendment to potentially limit at least some mass government surveillance. While the Fourth Amendment has been the sole source of search and seizure limitations, the Third Amendment should be added to the privacy calculus because it provides a clear allocation of power between military and civil authorities and creates a realm of privacy governed by civil law.

Consequently, in today’s digital world it would be improper to read the words of the Third Amendment literally, merely as surplusage. Instead, the Amendment’s check on government tyranny should be viewed as restricting cybersoldiers from focusing surveillance instrumentalities on and around private residences or businesses in an intrusive way – or using proxies to do so -- that would serve as the functional equivalent of military quartering in the civil community.

The Third Amendment states:

No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

I blogged a while back about another article that attempted to apply the Third Amendment to the government's digital actions. That article was Alan Butler's, When Cyberweapons End Up on Private Networks: Third Amendment Implications for Cybersecurity Policy, 62 Am. U. L. Rev.. 1203 (2013).

In my post on Butler's paper, and in my following post questioning whether law journals should publish scholarship on the Third Amendment, I was very critical about attempts to apply the Third Amendment to the digital world because of the Third Amendment's specific terminology of "soldier," "quartered," and "house."  I am of the opinion that attempts to apply the Third Amendment to digital surveillance stretches the meaning of the amendment far beyond what its text allows.

After reading Friedland's paper, I am confident that all of my criticism of Butler's paper applies to Friedland's attempt to apply the Third Amendment to the NSA's surveillance practices.  I think that Friedland's notably shorter paper makes even less of an effort to justify the overly broad interpretations of the Third Amendment than Butler's article.  And Butler's article was at least innovative in applying the Third Amendment to the government's digital actions -- Friedland's paper is not, because it is entirely pre-empted by Butler's article-- something that Friedland seems to belatedly acknowledge in his penultimate footnote:

A recent commentator has provided the Amendment with a similar construction. See Alan Butler, When Cyberweapons End Up on Private Networks: Third Amendment Implications for Cybersecurity Policy, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1203 (2013).

The only novel contribution Friedland's paper seems to make is to note that Butler's arguments may apply to NSA practices that have been leaked since Butler's article was published.  If this paper is sent out for publication, I hope that articles editors pay attention to the footnotes, and note that Friedland's (questionable) argument has already been made in much more depth.

Should Law Journals Publish Scholarship on the Third Amendment?

While I was writing my earlier post on Alan Butler's article, When Cyberweapons End Up on Private Networks: Third Amendment Implications for Cybersecurity Policy, I began wondering about the value of Third Amendment scholarship from the point of view of a law journal's articles editor.

Articles editors are the members of law reviews and journals who decide what submissions the journal should or should not accept for publication.  They have a number of different criteria to consider when determining whether to publish an article.  Most importantly (from a rankings perspective) how often will the article be cited?  Who will it be cited by?--by other law journals, or by judges?  How important is the subject of the article?  Is it getting a lot of news coverage?  Will the article itself get news coverage?  (For example: like this one?)  The list of considerations goes on.

In this post, I would like to list the reasons for and against publishing scholarship on the Third Amendment.  As somebody who is interested in researching this amendment, I will not pretend to be completely disinterested, although I would hope that my criticism of Butler's article illustrates that I can approach scholarship on this amendment in a less-than-cheerful manner.

So, without further adieu:

Reasons to Publish Third Amendment Scholarship

• Citation probability: there is an almost guaranteed core group of articles that will cite Third Amendment scholarship.  The group?  Other articles on the Third Amendment.  Any new paper on the Third Amendment must prove that the Third Amendment is not dead to the legal world.  To show this, the article will string-cite all the third amendment articles that the author can find - whether or not it relates to the issue the article addresses.  See, for example, footnote 14 of the previously-mentioned Butler article.
• Coverage: there is something quirky and fun about the Third Amendment.  People forget it exists, so when scholarship on it is published, people are naturally intrigued.  This means that it is more likely that people will react to the article -- either in the news or on blog posts, thereby increasing the coverage of the journal publishing the article.
• Influence: If a Third Amendment case were to surface, the judge overseeing the case would have very little case law to turn to in adjudicating the dispute.  This makes it more likely that the judge would turn to law review articles -- giving those journals publishing the articles potential citations in judicial opinions, or in the very least, some influence on the judge's decision-making process.
• Importance: a discerning editor may be able to find Third Amendment scholarship that is not only interesting, but also important.  This importance will most likely manifest from a historical perspective: examining past, significant events from a Third Amendment perspective.  For an example of an article that fits this description, see Tom W. Bell, "Property" in the Constitution: The View From the Third Amendment, 20 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1243 (2012).

Reasons Not to Publish Third Amendment Scholarship

• Citation probability: notwithstanding the previously-discussed core group of articles that cite Third Amendment scholarship, the probability that an article on the Third Amendment will be cited by future scholarship is decidedly lower than the probability of other articles being cited.
• Importance: a common feature of lots of Third Amendment scholarship is that it will involve evaluation of hypothetical Third Amendment violations.  This is because there are not many real-world examples of Third Amendment cases.  While hypotheticals might be intellectually stimulating, their ultimate relevance may be limited to the realm of the hypothetical.
• Sloppiness: closely related to the importance concern, Third Amendment scholarship is characterized by authors who want to make their scholarly contribution sound relevant by claiming that a real world problem may be approached from a Third Amendment perspective.  As I discussed in my criticism of the Butler article, the specificity of the Third Amendment (constrained to soldiers, quartering, and houses), is a substantial obstacle to these endeavors.  Editors who accept these articles run the risk of their journal endorsing this type of sloppy legal analysis.
• Preemption: while there may be some interesting historical perspectives on the Third Amendment, or interesting cases where the amendment was once relevant, there is a very real danger that new scholarship on the Third Amendment has been preempted.  There are some folks out there who I would label "Third Amendment Scholars" (Tom Bell being one) who have written a decent amount on the Third Amendment and the limited areas of interest in Third Amendment scholarship.  (See, e.g. Bell's article, The Third Amendment: Forgotten, But Not Gone)
• Prestige: higher ranking journals that routinely publish articles on cutting-edge, important legal topics might find that publishing scholarship on the Third Amendment tarnishes their reputation.  While there is some value to quirky articles that raise interesting questions, these qualities, without something more, can only take an article so far.  High ranking journals that publish such articles might find themselves the target of some raised eyebrows (or whatever the equivalent is in the legal scholarship world).

Conclusion

Third Amendment scholarship is a complicated subject for articles editors.  Deciding whether to publish a Third Amendment article may well come down to the type of article the editor is on.  For instance, a newer journal that has not yet established a substantial citation reputation and that wants media exposure would do well to consider Third Amendment scholarship.  On the other hand, an old, highly ranked journal that regularly receives numerous, high quality submissions may wish to forego Third Amendment articles -- many of which are grounded in the hypothetical or use stretched analogies.

Whatever the answer is for articles editors deciding what to publish, I find the Third Amendment interesting and worthy of investigation, so don't be surprised if you see me discuss it again on this blog.  And who knows?  Maybe I will find a way around typical problems of stretched analysis and hypotheticals and end up throwing my own two cents into legal scholarship on the Third Amendment.

The Third Amendment and Cybersecurity: Quirky But Mistaken

The latest version of the American University Law Review focuses on law and cybersecurity issues.  I have not read through the articles here, but there seem to be some interesting topics.

One of the articles in this issue that I ran across and read while doing one of my own projects is Alan Butler's, When Cyberweapons End Up on Private Networks: Third Amendment Implications for Cybersecurity Policy.  It is available on the American University Law Review website here and on SSRN here.  Here is the abstract:

National security experts have discussed the threat of cyberwarfare for more than twenty years, and there have been a number of high profile cyber attacks over that period. The recent escalation of cyberconflict became clear last year when the New York Times discovered that the United States and Israel had developed and used a worm, known as “Stuxnet,” to disrupt Iranian nuclear facilities. This shot across the bow, along with the recent creation of the U.S. Cybercommand, indicates that the United States has the capability to conduct sophisticated offensive and defensive cyberoperations. Scholars in international law, national security law, and privacy law are now attempting to define the legal rules and boundaries of cyberwarfare. The Obama Administration has also made clear that protecting privacy and civil liberties is a critical component of the U.S. cybersecurity plan. But so far it is unclear what protections will be included.

This article takes a novel approach to identifying necessary civil liberties protections by analyzing U.S. cyberoperations under the Third Amendment. Three types of cyberoperations implicate Third Amendment interests: malware designed to disrupt industrial control systems, cyberespionage tools, and active defense (or “hack-back”) systems. All of these may affect innocent civilian systems, and the Third Amendment prohibits military intrusion into civilian spaces absent consent or legal authorization by Congress.

Based on the principles of the Third Amendment, this article identifies three issues that must be addressed regarding cybersecurity policy: authority, cooperation, and transparency. It concludes that Congress must establish the framework for authorization of cyberoperations that could affect civilian networks; that the private sector has an interest in a public-private collaboration to establish security standards and processes; and that any comprehensive cybersecurity strategy must provide for a transparent, public accountability system to address civil liberties impacts. The Cybersecurity Executive Order is a step in the right direction, but Congress must still establish clear rules governing executive action in this area.

I am always up for some discussion or scholarship on the Third Amendment.  I mentioned a modern case (and alluded to Butler's article) in a previous post, and as I mention in this future (!) post, there are some valid reasons for law journals to publish Third Amendment scholarship (though these reasons should be weighed against the reasons not to publish).

I'm not the only one who was intrigued by Butler's article, with reactions and mentions in the blog/legal commentary world here and here.  The commentators seem to agree with Butler's arguments.  I don't necessarily blame them; the Third Amendment is so rarely mentioned or considered in constitutional law scholarship that any article about it seems delightfully quirky.

Unfortunately, behind the quirky facade of Butler's article there lies a flawed and ultimately unsuccessful argument.  I will dismantle it after the jump.

A Modern Third Amendment Case

Over at the Volokh Conspiracy, Ilya Somin posts about a Nevada lawsuit against the police based on the Fourth Amendment, state law, and, interestingly, the Third Amendment.  The plaintiffs contend that police intrusion into their home for purposes of maintaining a lookout position over the plaintiffs' neighbor violated their Third Amendment rights against the quartering of soldiers in their home.  According to the complaint, the rights violation occurred when the police broke into plaintiffs' home, fired multiple nonlethal rounds at one of the plaintiffs, arrested them for obstructing a police investigation, and maintained a lookout of the neighbor's house.

Somin notes the obvious problems with this theory, noting that police are not soldiers and also pointing out that the Third Amendment has not been incorporated against the states.  Somin also points out that the Third Amendment is still worthy of consideration, noting a history of violations that are not often recognized.

I think that there is an additional problem with the lawsuit, since the Third Amendment is a prohibition on soldiers being "quartered" in homes, rather than simply intruding into homes.  Police acting as lookouts on a nearby home probably would not constitute the "quartering" of soldiers--almost certainly not under any original understanding of the Third Amendment, which was enacted in response to the quartering of British soldiers in the colonies.

Despite the various problems with this lawsuit, I still find the Third Amendment to be worthy of attention, if for no other reason than it is of historical interest.  I also think that there have been some modern events that -- if they occurred in the United States -- could raise stronger Third Amendment concerns.  Take, for example, this story from 2012 where the British military installed missile turrets on various apartments surrounding the Olympic stadium for purposes of preventing terrorist attacks.  If a similar situation were to arise in the United States, this would probably raise a stronger Third Amendment case than the Nevada case.  While there would likely be "quartering" concerns, since there is no indication that military personnel are not being housed at the apartment, the permanence of the installation and their military nature would be at least a plausible Third Amendment violation.  I have also seen the Third Amendment mentioned in the cybersecurity context where the government requires the installation of security programs, though I have not had enough time to explore this or see how it would overcome several very obvious problems.

While I think the Nevada lawsuit's Third Amendment claim is not going to survive, I do think that the Third Amendment is interesting and something that I will look into more in the future.