Section Three, Originalism, and Interpretive Alternatives

William Baude and Michael Stokes Paulsen have written a recent article, "The Sweep and Force of Section Three," in which they argue that Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment is a self-executing provision that renders Donald Trump ineligible for the presidency as a result of his role in attempting to overthrow the results of the 2020 election.

The article has been the talk of both legal academia and the wider public in recent weeks, drawing a great deal of attention and drawing support and criticism from various scholars and commentators. While this post adds to the commentary, let me emphasize at the outset that I do not dig into the weeds of the historical claims or evidence that Baude and Paulsen amass. Indeed, this post isn't so much a response to the article, but instead derives primarily from how Baude and Paulsen have described and defended their claims in follow-up discussions (particularly in recent episodes of "Amarica's Constitution," which Baude highlights here), and have only reviewed portions of the article that get into the interpretive issues I focus on here.

This was initially meant to be a response to a brief comment Michael Ramsey's post at The Originalism Blog, which highlighted some recent coverage of Baude and Paulsen's article. Ramsey closes his post with this comment:

There's a lot of originalism in these debates and in commentary on the Section 3 issues generally. It's worth noting that the nonoriginalist alternative is that judges decide whether Trump should be disqualified based on their intuitive assessment of what's best in light of modern needs and circumstances.

This characterization of the options for interpreting Section Three is an oversimplification. And it's an oversimplification worth highlighting because of its frequent occurrence in debates between originalists and nonoriginalists--including in Baude and Paulsen's defense of their claims against certain critiques.

Contrary to Ramsey's claim, there are a number of nonoriginalist means by which one may interpret Section Three before resorting to mere intuitive assessments. A judge might interpret the text by reference to its present meaning and understanding, as well as how it fits in with the structure of the Fourteenth Amendment and the rest of the Constitution, without looking to the historical debates over the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning and place in the Constitution. Alternatively, a judge may look to how Section Three has been interpreted in subsequent cases and rely on meaning developed over time through common law reasoning to determine how that language should be applied in a present case. And while "intuitive assessment" of modern needs suggests little more than going with one's gut, or shooting from the hip based on initial impressions, considerations of modern needs and circumstances--albeit through thorough consideration of consequences and careful reasoning--may also play a role, as those espousing pragmatist theories of interpretation argue at length.

And even the method that Ramsey highlights is one worth noting. As concerning as "intuitive assessment" might sound, considering modern needs and circumstances probably ought to play at least some role in the decisionmaking process--even if those considerations factor in on a level beyond interpretation. Even if there's a strong originalist argument in favor of disqualification, one shouldn't lose sight of the broader context. Indeed, another originalist, Michael McConnell, urges a narrow reading of Section Three out of concern for the consequences of a broad reading:

Putting together my friends' broad definitions of "insurrection" and "engage," and lack of concern about enforcement procedure, I worry that this approach could empower partisans to seek disqualification every time a politician supports or speaks in support of the objectives of a political riot. Imagine how bad actors will use this theory. If that is what Section 3 necessarily means, we have to live with it. But in my opinion, we should seek the narrowest, most precise, least susceptible to abuse, definition that is consistent with history and precedent. In the absence of actual engagement in actual insurrection, judged as such by competent authorities, we should allow the American people to vote for the candidates of their choice.

Baude and Paulsen respond by arguing that this is an inappropriate way to interpret the Constitution (both in the initial link and in this second episode as well). They argue that concerns over misapplication of a particular interpretation do not invalidate the criticized interpretation, and analogize McConnell's concerns over consequences to a judge's first selecting a preferred result and then structuring an interpretive method that ensures the result. Instead, they argue, one should engage in principled interpretation to figure out what the Constitution truly means, and follow that meaning from there, even if it might lead to unexpected or undesirable consequences.

Baude and Paulsen take this position in their article as well. Here's an example of this point from their article, in which they critique Chief Justice (or, in this case, Circuit Justice) Chase's opinion in In re Griffin:

Chase’s construe-to-avoid-the-force-of-constitutional-language-whose-policy-consequences-you-dislike approach to constitutional interpretation is simply wrong. Judges do not get to rewrite constitutional provisions they find objectionable on policy grounds. Relatedly, judges do not get to make up new provisions of law in order to devise policy “solutions” to texts they don’t like. Chase’s opinion imposed, as a solution to textual literalism and its real and imagined policy inconveniences, a different kind of constitutional provision, one more like the Impeachment Clause and the Treason Clause. Put bluntly, Chase made up law that was not there in order to change law that was there but that he did not like. (p. 40)

As Baude and Paulsen advance this argument--both in the excerpt above, and in responding to McConnell's critique--they tend to treat concern over consequences as something distinct from a theory of interpretation. This, at least, is the impression I get when they claim to be following the Constitution's meaning wherever it will lead, rather than letting consequences dictate how the Constitution ought to be given effect. In particular, they argue that originalist interpretation--looking to the original public meaning of the Constitution--is the way to go, and pragmatic considerations are something other than interpretation entirely. Ramsey's characterization of "intuitive assessments" of modern needs suggests this as well--this isn't "interpretation," it's "intuition."

As foreshadowed above, all of builds from the assumption that originalism is the way to interpret the Constitution. If this is the case, than consideration of consequences does indeed seem to go beyond the interpretive process and lead to false conclusions. But as discussed earlier, this is not the case. It isn't originalism or nothing. And it isn't originalism or "intuition." Rather, there are multiple potential approaches to choose from. And, as it turns out, judges often employ multiple approaches, both across cases and within cases, when interpreting the Constitution--a method broadly labeled as "pluralist" interpretation. Baude and Paulsen seem to avoid this underlying debate over methodology, asserting an originalist approach from the outset and proceeding from there. (see, e.g., pp. 8-9). But the possibilities of alternate methodologies should at least qualify assertions that considerations beyond original meaning are "simply wrong."

One might object to my highlighting debate over alternate theories of constitutional interpretation by arguing that the majority of Supreme Court Justices are originalists, and that it therefore makes sense to take as given that the Court will employ an originalist method in interpreting Section Three (should the issue make its way to them). Paulsen, at least, seems to express such a view in his first interview with Amar, going so far as to suggest that the Court may side 9-0 in favor of Trump's in eligibility (with the originalist justices following the article, and the three liberal justices taking an approach more in line with Ramsey's "intuitive assessment" approach). 

I'm not as convinced. The Court's approach to originalism tends to be inconsistent at best, including in recent cases that many commentators mistakenly describe as originalist decisions. I suspect that some of the more conservative justices may be at least tempted to give in to political leanings. I also suspect that these leanings may join in a coalition with institutional concerns that prompt the Court to avoid ruling that Trump is disqualified out of a fear of political backlash. All of this should give pause to assumptions that the Court will embrace interpretive principles above politics.

But say we set aside the meta-theoretical debate and accept an originalist approach to interpretation. Even then, consequences of that method still may play a role in the overall interpretive process. Considerations beyond the text frequently play a role in interpretation when the text to be interpreted is broad, undefined, or otherwise capable of multiple meanings. In choosing how to give effect to that text--say, in selecting one of multiple potential meanings, including original meanings--judges may opt for an interpretation that has better consequences or, if the case involves invalidating a law, leaving the law in place out of deference to the democratic process. 

We can make the description of the process a bit more precise by distinguishing between linguistic meaning and legal meaning. Lawrence Solum does so in distinguishing the initial step of "interpretation" (deriving the linguistic meaning of a provision) from "construction" (giving legal effect to that meaning). Perhaps Baude and Paulsen have a stronger argument that consequences don't play a role in that first step of interpretation. But even then, I'm not sure if this is right, or if it matters. The possibility remains that a theory of interpretation (that does not account for consequences) may lead to multiple meanings, including broader and narrower interpretations in the Section Three context. Sure, we may be able to narrow things down to a smaller range of potential meanings using interpretation. But the entire debate may still center around which of those meanings ought to be accepted by actors tasked with putting interpretation into effect.

And that's the debate that Baude and Paulsen have chosen to enter. For one, their argument quoted above critiques how Chase "construe[d]" Section Three--strongly suggesting they're talking about how the language is constructed. But more fundamentally, they cannot simply dismiss the process in which semantic meaning translates to legal action through government action (whether by state secretaries of states or judges). After all, they've written an article that expresses conclusions regarding what Section Three requires of modern actors, and they therefore must take all considerations into account--both at the initial stage of determining the meaning of words on a page, to the next stage of how those meanings ought to be put into effect by legal actors.

I suspect the response to this is that the original semantic meaning of Section Three is so determinate (or, "thick,") that there's no need for construction. As noted at the outset, I'm not here to argue against Baude and Paulsen on their historical points, and they've done a great deal of legwork to set forth their argument. In making this argument, I assume that Baude and Paulsen have done a thorough job of canvassing the history, amassing the argument, and providing support for their conclusions.

Even so, proving a semantic meaning that is so thick that consequentialist arguments may simply be swept beside is a tall order. Remember, construction may be required where there are multiple potential original meanings. These multiple meanings may result from the inquiry originalism requires, which involves surveying a wide range of detailed, sometimes contradictory historical accounts. It may not be certain what the original meaning was from such an investigation. Alternatively, multiple meanings may be what the interpretive inquiry turns up. A thorough examination of the historical evidence may reveal that, at the time of ratification, people held different beliefs about the meaning of Section Three. 

To be sure, one may decide to go with what appears to be the most common meaning, or to avoid meanings that only seemed to exist in certain camps (say, critics of the Fourteenth Amendment, or only people with certain expertise). But this move of selecting between alternate meanings is itself a form of construction. And the question then becomes: why allow this form of construction, while dismissing alternative forms of construction that take into account the consequences of one interpretation over another?

Baude and Paulsen must address this question as critics continue to raise concerns over the practical implications of their arguments. Thus far, their move seems to be to distinguish their interpretive arguments from consequential considerations--considerations that they claim are irrelevant to the core interpretive inquiry. The discussion above, though, suggests why this may not be the case even if Baude and Paulsen have made a strong originalist showing.

As a final note in this already lengthy post, I do not rule out the possibility of other interpretive methods reaching the same conclusion as Baude and Paulsen. McConnell raises consequentialist concerns in one direction, but the consequences of a minimal reading of Section Three in the face of such flagrant misconduct by Trump may undermine fundamental qualifications for office in the short and long term that may outweigh potential abuse of the provision. And interpretive methods beyond originalism or pragmatism may also get to the same result. I confess that my political preferences align me with Baude and Paulsen's conclusions about disqualification, as I think that Trump's conduct is reprehensible and should dissuade any reasonable voter from supporting him. But it's still worth delving into the assumptions underlying the constitutional interpretation dimension of the debate, even if doing so might cast doubt on conclusions I find agreeable.

Strategic Originalism

About a week ago, Ruth Marcus at the Washington Post wrote an essay attacking originalism. Her critiques are varied and are digestible versions of arguments made at length in the academic literature. Those looking for an approachable version of a variety of arguments critiquing originalism would do well to read her entire essay.

At the National Review, Ed Whelan responds to Marcus's criticism of originalism. Both essays involve multiple levels of critiques and responses, and I won't rehash the line-by-line debate. Instead, I will first address an exchange over whether originalism is guilty of making false promises about the objectivity of the Constitution's meaning and how Whelan's response fails to engage with Marcus's critique. I then address a brief response to the exchange by Michael Ramsey which exemplifies a common misconception of the implications of progressive originalist scholarship, From there, I address the question of whether the strategic use of originalism by progressive scholars and commentators is worthwhile. 

Originalism and Clear Answers

In Michael Ramsey's summary of Whelan's response to Marcus, he highlights the following portion of Whelan's article that he thinks calls out the "most important" flaw in Marcus's critique:

Marcus contends that originalism “offers the mere mirage of objectivity and therefore of constraint” and is a “fundamental[ly] futil[e]” enterprise. She quotes with approval the notion that “For most constitutional provisions, there is no ‘original meaning’ to be discovered.”

I have no quarrel with the proposition that there are many constitutional questions to which originalism cannot provide a clear answer. Nor, I think, do other originalists. But that is no reason to dismiss originalism when it can provide a clear answer. And on most of the hot-button questions of the past several decades (e.g., abortion), originalism clearly rejects the favored progressive position.

Originalists recognize the incompleteness of originalism as a judicial methodology, and they differ on important questions such as what level of certainty as to constitutional meaning is needed to decline to enforce a statute. I, for example, have defended a presumption of constitutionality, while many libertarians propose a presumption of unconstitutionality. There are also lots of methodological issues on which originalists hold various views. Marcus could fairly have cited this lack of consensus as a flaw in originalism.

It's worth including the precise language of Marcus's original argument that prompts these responses:

The shifting forms of originalism — from trying to discern the intent of the document’s framers, or maybe those who ratified it, to hunting for the original meaning of the words they used — suggests the fundamental futility of the enterprise. “For most constitutional provisions, there is no ‘original meaning’ to be discovered,” Berkeley law dean Erwin Chemerinsky writes in a new book, “Worse Than Nothing: The Dangerous Fallacy of Originalism.” Rather, he says, “there is a range of possibilities that allows for exactly the kind of judicial discretion that originalism seeks to eliminate.” The founding-era documents are incomplete and contradictory; there are many constitutional questions for which they supply no answer.

Whelan's response fails to engage with Marcus's original point. While Whelan concedes that there may be instances where originalism doesn't provide a clear answer, it is not clear how much of a concession this is. And, two sentences later, Whelan seems to limit the scope of his concession so that it does not cover "most of the hot-button questions of the past several decades." For these, Whelan claims, "originalism clearly rejects the favored progressive position."

In my not-so-distant prior career as a litigator, the word "clearly" is something I always searched for when I was preparing an opposition or reply to an opposing party's brief. This term tended to signal the most dubious claims. This is the case here. In a single sentence, Whelan waves aside libraries' worth of debate between legal scholars and historians over the original meaning of constitutional provisions at the heart of disputes over the last few decades. Whelan also fails to engage with the deeper point: history is a complex undertaking, and a thorough investigation into the original meaning of the Constitution may reveal that there is no clear original meaning. If this is the case, originalism does not seem appropriate to resolve a dispute where the Court must rule on a single meaning.

Marcus also critiques the methodology of corpus linguistics, in which lawyers and judges search databases of documents from a particular time period to determine how words and phrases were commonly used. Her broader point is that the methodology is an example of her overall argument: that uniform historical meaning is uncertain and potentially nonexistent. Whelan also fails to engage with this, focusing instead on Marcus's examples of how corpus linguistics being misapplied. He argues that this is an argument "for using corpus linguistics cautiously, not an argument against originalism." This ignores the larger point that corpus linguistics demonstrates originalism's indeterminacy. But to respond directly to Whelan's assertion, I've argued before that it's relevant to point out instances where corpus linguistics is misapplied. If this is a common mistake, then it risks a great deal of shoddy analysis under the guise of originalism--something that should raise more concern for someone like Whelan than he expresses in his response.

(This same point applies to theories of interpretation more generally as well, as I've begun to argue here, but I will leave that point aside since this post is already becoming too long, and because I'll be saying much more on this in a future article.)

Strategic Originalism

The last issue I want to address in this already lengthy post--and the issue that inspired me to write this post in the first place--is prompted by the remark that Ramsey includes after quoting Whelan's response to Marcus:

I agree with all of this, and I'd add that many center-left commentators and legal scholars are very willing to make originalist arguments when they perceive that the original meaning helps their preferred view (as it sometimes does).

Ramsey does not explain the implications of his remark, but he seems to be suggesting that those on the left are conceding the legitimacy of originalism as a theory of interpretation by resorting to originalism when it serves their desired political ends. This inference is dubious because originalist arguments may be made in a strategic manner to appeal to a conservative Court. Those making the arguments may not agree with their methodology, but such arguments may have a slightly better chance of getting the Court's attention than a straight up critique of the Court's interpretive methodology.

In the past I tended to think that progressive originalist commentary and scholarship was of little use and caused more harm than good to progressive policy objectives. Ramsey's point illustrates one of the main reasons I held this view: progressive scholarship employing originalist methodology could be characterized as legitimizing originalism. I did not agree with this inference, as I believe it is not only possible, but common, to assume certain conditions for the sake of argument and then to argue against a certain conclusion on those terms. But, as Ramsey's remark here demonstrates, this distinction is frequently overlooked for the purpose of achieving a "gotcha" argument against progressive scholars and commentators who also disapprove of originalism more broadly.

Moreover, I believed then (as I do now) that history and tradition is often skewed against progressive outcomes. Many of the Constitution's framers owned slaves. Women's rights were limited at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's passage, and many legal regimes denied women the legal status and abilities held by men. Originalism may not provide clear answers on the meaning of vague and ambiguous constitutional provisions. In the face of this uncertainty, interpreters may give history and tradition an outsized role in constitutional interpretation. Indeed, the Court seems to have leaned into this approach in its last term, as I detail here. In cases involving the interests of women, racial minorities, and other groups who have historically been subjected to oppressive legal regimes, an approach grounded in history and tradition will tend toward negative outcomes for these groups. This isn't a fair playing field, and originalist suggestions that progressives simply must engage more at the level of historical debate are therefore unconvincing.

Despite all of this, my views today of the value of progressive originalist arguments and scholarship are now more nuanced than they once were. While it is easy for a scholar or commentator to take a stance on little more than principle, considering how commentary and scholarship may ultimately be employed in practice remains important. Broad theoretical arguments have their place: they may inform the public and politicians of the state of constitutional interpretation and, to the extent that things are unsatisfactory, provide arguments for reform. 

But scholars and commentators shouldn't forget that there are attorneys who need to make arguments before the Court--a Court with a supermajority of justices who are either self-proclaimed originalists or who have at least signed onto opinions written in a purportedly originalist manner. These advocates before the Court don't have the luxury of high-level theoretical arguments. A claim that originalism is a flawed method will fail to move these justices. Instead, these advocates' best hope of success (admittedly, a very slim hope) is to argue on the justices' level. It is here that progressive originalist scholarship and commentary may be of use. A cottage industry of originalist scholars are at work parsing out the original meaning of constitutional provisions. Maintaining an ideological balance in these scholarly endeavors makes it less likely that the output of this area of legal academia will remain politically one-sided. While originalist scholarship that reveals outcomes that align with progressive policy goals may not end up convincing conservative justices, it at least lends additional support to advocates arguing before them.

Circling back to Ramsey's point about center-left commentators' and scholars' originalist arguments: these scholars may well disagree with originalism as an interpretive methodology but acknowledge the practical reality that those arguing before the Court need to makes arguments at the originalist level. Researching, writing, and commenting on historical evidence of original meaning that favors progressive outcomes is therefore not a concession that originalism is a good, or even legitimate, approach to interpretation. Instead, the work is motivated by a pragmatic acknowledgment of the realities of litigating before a conservative Supreme Court.

One may object and argue that I'm claiming that scholars are hacks. I seem to be assuming that conservative scholars will seek out conservative originalist conclusions, while progressive scholars will strive for liberal originalist conclusions. This seems to require an unrealistic amount of politically motivated academic dishonesty. Such an objective does not accurately characterize my views.

First, political bias in research outcomes will likely be unintentional in many instances. Many (though not all) legal scholars lack sufficient expertise as historians to engage in the rigorous and technical investigation necessary to accurately survey historical evidence. As a result, unconscious biases may color their analysis. These range from nonpartisan biases of applying modern legal frameworks or usages to the reading of historical texts. But they may also include interpreting a vague or ambiguous piece of evidence in a manner that ends up supporting a desired conclusion. 

Second, journals themselves may encourage conclusions that align with particular political ends. Some law journals pride themselves on publishing conservative scholarship. Others are the opposite, encouraging submissions that align with progressive policy positions. As a scholar's investigation begins to uncover evidence that leans in a certain direction, that scholar's desire to be published in one of these journals, or to associate with a particular audience, may end up motivating the scholar to seek out more of the same evidence rather than taking a more balanced approach to the investigation.

Third, scholars who are directly motivated by their political goals may end up implementing these political preferences in a manner that does not involve intellectual dishonesty. A progressive professor, for example, may come to believe after some research that the original meaning of a constitutional provision leads to conservative outcomes. The professor may decline to continue that research or publish the results of that investigation in the interest of avoiding giving ammunition to political opponents. Such a strategy involves political motivation and may raise questions over intellectual honesty and selective publications, but it seems distinguishable from a scholar who ignores contrary evidence or makes false claims in support of a desired conclusion.

My opinion of progressive originalist scholarship and commentary is nuanced. While I have come around to acknowledging its importance for those arguing before the Court, I suspect that even accurate and exhaustively researched progressive originalist work makes little difference to the conservative justices and may be crowded out by shoddy work written and published by those lacking sufficient historical expertise. Additionally, remarks like Ramsey's suggest that this work may be coopted to support claims of progressive acceptance of originalist methodology. Despite all of this, strategic originalism has its place in progressive legal scholarship and advocacy. And while this work may not influence the justices presently on the Court, it may serve as a basis for changing Constitutional law in the decades to come.

Originalism is Neutral Because the Court Hasn't Outlawed Abortion Everywhere?

That seems to what Michael Ramsey argues in response to this column by Paul Waldman.  Waldman argues (fervently) that conservative justices vote their political preferences and are not constrained by purportedly neutral theories of interpretation:

It was all a lie, a scam, a con: the assurances that they were blank slates committed to “originalism” and “textualism,” that they wouldn’t “legislate from the bench,” that they have no agenda but merely a “judicial philosophy.”

Somehow that philosophy nearly always produces results conservatives want: undermining voting rights, enhancing corporate power, constraining the rights of workers, enabling the proliferation of guns, and now most vividly, allowing state governments to force women to carry pregnancies to term against their will.

Ramsey takes issue with this:

But the abortion case actually shows the opposite of Waldman's claim.  The conservative legal movement doesn't want just to overturn Roe; it (or at least part that cares most about the issue) wants to outlaw abortion.  In Dobbs, though, at most the Court may merely withdraw the constitutional bar on abortion restrictions so that the question can be resolved by the political branches. 

Why not do more?  Why wouldn't the Court rule that states that permit abortion violate the Constitution?  If the conservative Court really believes it can "legislate from the bench" to "produce[ ] results conservatives want," isn't that the outcome we would expect?

Surely the Constitution can accommodate that conclusion.  As many on the left have argued, the Constitution's due process and equal protection clauses are open-ended and can be read to appeal to broad principles to be applied in light of contemporary morality and policy.  If, as anti-abortion conservatives believe, human life begins at conception or some point near to it, an aggressive living-constitutionalist conservative could find in those clauses a protection for unborn life.  Far less plausible claims have been made and accepted by courts on behalf of the policies of the left.

The conservative originalist Justices on the Court are not going to rule this way, and Justice Scalia -- as firmly anti-abortion as anyone -- never considered it.  The reason is originalism.  Though a few scholars have argued to the contrary, the overwhelming mainstream originalist position, among both scholars and judges, is that the Constitution's original meaning does not protect unborn life.  (See here from Jonathan Adler: Why the 14th Amendment Does Not Prohibit Abortion.)  It is the Justices' commitment to originalism and textualism that prevents them from legislating from the bench to achieve conservative policy goals in the abortion debate.  (And originalism is criticized by some conservatives on this ground.)

Ramsey claims that originalism is what prevents conservative Justices from affirmatively outlawing abortion. But this is what overturning Roe would do, to a significant extent. If the Court overturns Roe by upholding a ban on abortion, the effect is that abortion is banned in the affected jurisdiction.  Not only that, but it's immediately banned in 21 other states as well. Overturning Roe has the practical impact of banning abortion immediately in nearly half of the states. 

Sure, it isn't a nationwide ban. But once Roe is overturned, how soon will it be until there is federal legislation to ban abortion nationwide? From betting that's going on in academic spheres, it look like the expectation is a couple of days. With Roe out of the way, lobbying and support for such a law will redouble, backed by assertions that it has the Court's blessing. I hope that this is a pessimistic view of things--maybe the overturning of Roe will light a fire under democrats and prompt them to take action. But I'm not optimistic this will happen.

Such a federal law wouldn't be a constitutional decree. But under this chain of events, the conservative Justices' goal of outlawing abortion would be achieved with no other Court action beyond overturning Roe v. Wade. The Court would not suffer the institutional loss of credibility that an aggressive, constitution-based ban on abortion would entail. The Court would therefore be free to support conservative policies and goals under the guise of originalism's neutrality in any number of other cases and contexts.  Ramsey claims that a refusal to affirmatively outlaw abortion on constitutional grounds is evidence of originalism's constraining effect. A far more plausible explanation is that conservative justices want to preserve their influence and credibility, and can do so at no cost, since most of the work they want to see done will be done for them by other political actors.

Just because the Court doesn't take an immediate and drastic turn to the right and capitulate to the wildest dreams of the most extreme conservatives does not prove that originalism is the neutral, constraining principle that its proponents claim it to be. Claiming that this is what must be demonstrated to prove that originalism covers up political decisions is a disingenuous tactic that moves the goalposts and ignores political context.

Pennsylvania State Legislator Contemplates Statewide Law Against "Distracted Walking"

A recent editorial from TN Online reports:

State Rep. Karen Boback, a Republican whose district includes parts of Luzerne and Lackawanna counties, says she is going to introduce legislation that provides penalties for walkers who are inattentive while crossing a street or highway.

In a memo to legislative colleagues seeking co-sponsors for her bill, Boback said that distracting walking is a “very real and serious issue.”

Boback is most concerned with pedestrians who are inattentive because they are engrossed in conversations on their cellphones or are listening to music or other programming.

“Technology has invaded our life, and, as a result, people have stopped paying attention to their surroundings,” Boback wrote.

More reporting on this is available at Patch. It isn't clear why Boback is choosing to take a stand against "distracted walking." The TN Online writer notes that fewer pedestrians were killed by drivers in 2020 than in 2019. Of those 145 deaths, there is no indication how many of them, if any, were due to pedestrians who were distracted. 

Seeking to do Boback's job of justifying her proposed policy, the article cites a Governors Highway Safety Association Report which purportedly shows that "texting while walking has taken on a key role in pedestrian death in recent years as communication devices have become more mobile, compact, and numerous." The article fails to link to the report, or provide a year for when it was written. It may be citing this 2016 report which speculates that pedestrian distractions are contributing to pedestrian deaths and injuries, although it explicitly states that it "remains unknown" how many pedestrians killed in crashes with distracted drivers were themselves distracted. The report cites instances and studies suggesting that pedestrian distractions are on the rise, but does not draw a link between such distractions and traffic deaths. Indeed, a New York study specifically investigating whether distracted walking contributed to pedestrian fatalities and injuries found "little concrete evidence" of a connection.

The Pennsylvania law appears to be in its early stages, as it does not appear that a statute has been drafted yet. Hopefully Boback will give the bill some more thought and conclude that it isn't worth it. Indeed, her basis for contemplating the bill appears to be anecdotal notions of technology "invading" people's lives. Reports on her proposal have to do the work themselves to dig up evidence supporting measures restricting texting while walking, and these reports often fail to confirm a link between instances of distracted walking and increased pedestrian deaths. As I have noted before, legislators seeking to prevent traffic deaths, and particularly pedestrian deaths, would do better to focus on infrastructure by making cities and towns safer for pedestrians. This includes increasing the number of crosswalks, ensuring adequate lighting, lowering speed limits, and reducing the width of streets, among other measures. Boback herself appears to have been involved in such infrastructure measures in the recent past, which makes it all the more surprising that she is seeking to put the onus on pedestrians--who are most at risk of death or serious injury. A statewide restriction on distracted walking is a blunt instrument that targets the wrong actors and ignores factors that lead to greater risks of pedestrian death and injury.

In addition to being misguided from a public safety perspective, laws against distracted walking criminalize ubiquitous behavior, which promotes selective enforcement. Many people check their phones while walking, including while crossing the street. As a result, police officers tasked with the enforcing the law will use their discretion to determine who to stop and ticket for these violations, meaning that the brunt of any law will likely fall more heavily on people in poorer neighborhoods and racial minorities.

A few cities and municipalities in the United States and other countries have banned various forms of walking while on the phone or while using other electronic devices. All of these measures target a phenomenon that most have likely observed or experienced, but which has little ultimate impact on pedestrian safety--at least when compared with other measures that legislatures can take to reduce traffic deaths and injuries. This story is notable because it suggests that a statewide ban may be possible. One can only hope that the bill, if it is ever written, will fail to gain the support necessary to become law.

Iowa's Law Targeting "Critical Race Theory"

A few weeks ago, Iowa's governor signed a law that she claimed would address the teaching of "critical race theory." Shortly after she signed the bill into law, the Des Moines Register reported:

Iowa Gov. Kim Reynolds signed a new law that she said will target the teaching of critical race theory and other concepts in government diversity trainings and classroom curriculum.

“Critical Race Theory is about labels and stereotypes, not education. It teaches kids that we should judge others based on race, gender or sexual identity, rather than the content of someone’s character,” Reynolds said in a statement. “I am proud to have worked with the legislature to promote learning, not discriminatory indoctrination.”

Critical race theory, a decades-old legal theory that examines how slavery's legacy continues to influence American society, is not specifically named in the new legislation. But the law would ban teaching certain concepts, such as that the U.S. or Iowa is systemically racist.

The new law, House File 802, goes into effect July 1.

Reynolds' signing comes as other Republicans across the country have said they want to eliminate teaching critical race theory and associated concepts from classrooms. Iowa is among more than a dozen states that have considered legislation this year aimed at eliminating similar concepts from classroom curriculum.

That same Register article notes that Iowa's law is based "nearly word for word" on an executive order issued by the Trump Administration (that is now repealed) that banned certain forms of diversity training for federal contractors. The Register's prior reporting on that order is here, the order itself is here.

There are a number of glaring practical problems with the law, which appear to be based, in part, on the bill's origin in a ban on training for contractors. For one, the law contains no penalty or disciplinary provisions, so it is unclear what would result from a violation of the law. The bill also includes prohibitions on certain types of training, but also includes restrictions for school curricula. While the restrictions on training are somewhat explicit, the restrictions on school districts and their curricula are woefully vague.

These defects, and others, are addressed in the remainder of this post, which walks through the law and tries to make sense of what is being restricted.

How Many Times Can a Complaint Be Amended?

This post aims to answer a simple question: what is the highest number of amendments to a complaint that has ever been allowed by a court in the United States?

A bit of background first. This post concerns civil litigation, where plaintiffs typically file a complaint setting forth various causes of action against defendants who have allegedly wronged them. These complaints are often amended. Sometimes plaintiffs add or remove parties. Plaintiffs may also add or remove causes of action or factual allegations in support of their causes of action. A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint, and if they succeed, the court may grant the plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. Granting leave to amend at least once is common--unless a defendant has clearly demonstrated that a plaintiff's case is completely futile, a court will likely give the plaintiff another shot.

While many cases I've litigated have involved amended, second amended, or even fourth amended complaints, I was curious about the maximum number of amendments courts have allowed. A first amended complaint isn't too hard for a plaintiff to get. But when a court is confronted with a complaint that has been drafted and redrafted multiple times, the probability that the court will give a plaintiff yet another chance decreases.

From my exhaustive research (searching for "tenth amended complaint" and increasing the numbers until I could find no further results), it appears that the most amended complaint on record was amended twenty-two times.  The case is Mirarchi v. Boockvar, and it's a recent one--with the original complaint filed on January 12, 2021 in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (case no. 5:21-CV-00126). A publicly-accessible link to the docket is here.

I've answered the question I set out to investigate, but I dug into the case itself, as I was curious about what would give rise to so many amendments. For those of you brave enough to dive into that nonsense, read on:

Does the Constitution Prohibit DC Statehood?

With the Democratic party in control of the House and Senate, discussions have been picking up over whether the District of Columbia will be granted statehood.  Proponents argue that residents of the District, many of whom are African American, lack sufficient representation in Congress and the Senate, and point to the fact that DC's population is larger than Wyoming, which has a representative and two senators.  Critics argue that DC statehood is a political effort to increase the number of Democratic senators.  

Politically charged debates often prompt accusations of unconstitutionality by one side or the other, even if the Constitution truly has no say on the matter. Critics of DC statehood are advancing such arguments, exemplified by this article published yesterday by the Wall Street Journal's Editorial Page.

The WSJ Editorial Board's primary argument is that the Constitution mandates that DC remain a district that is not a state, and Democratic statehood proposals violate this provision of the Constitution:

Fashioning an independent seat of government in a federal system while affording representation to its residents is a dilemma dating to the founding. The Framers provided in the Constitution’s Article I that Congress could, “by cession of particular states,” control a small area in which the federal government would operate. In 1790 part of the territories of Virginia and Maryland, two of the 13 states that ratified the Constitution, were delineated for federal control.

Advocates of statehood brush aside the constitutional concerns and frame their cause as a simple question of democracy. It’s true that the roughly 700,000 residents of the District don’t have the ability to elect voting Members of Congress. Many hold influence over the federal government as employees and contractors or in other positions, and in the Founding era proximity to the seat of power was itself considered a form of representation.

 

Yet the natural remedy for the imperfect status quo, if representation is the real concern, would be for Congress to do something it has done before—return part of the District to the state that ceded it in the first place. That’s what happened in 1846 when Congress reinstated Virginia’s control over the D.C. suburbs of Arlington and Alexandria.

 . . .

There could be constitutional challenges to retrocession to Maryland. But the creation of an independent state to supplant the District, as the current House legislation proposes, is certainly unconstitutional. The Founders deliberately created a federal district under the control of Congress because it didn’t want the federal government to be subject to the sway of any one state. Statehood imposed by statute would strip Congress of one of its enumerated powers—effectively amending the Constitution without an amendment process.

Others advance similar claims that the Constitution "mandated" creation of the District of Columbia. They all appear to be citing Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution, which provides that:

The Congress shall have the power . . . [t]o exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings

First, these arguments do not appear to have any force against what Democrats are proposing. Democrats are not advocating the complete elimination of the District described in the Constitution. Instead, they are proposing that the District be limited to a much smaller area, with the rest of DC becoming a separate state. The Constitution does mandate a particular location or size (beyond a maximum size) for the District, and shrinking the District is therefore consistent with this constitutional provision.

But critics' arguments run into an even more fundamental problem--they are based on an assumption that the Constitution mandates the creation of the District of Columbia. This is not apparent from the language of Article I, which grants a power to Congress to exercise exclusive legislation over whatever District "as may" become the seat of the United States' government. This isn't to say that creating such a District isn't a good idea, as certain founders recognized. But permitting Congress to exercise a particular power is a far cry from mandating that Congress do so.

I suspect that this reading of Article I is inconsistent with most of these same critics' approach to other provisions of Article I, like Congress's power to regulate commerce. Conservatives have long opposed extensive application of Article I's Commerce Clause to federal legislation governing sales transactions that take place within a single state. In opposing broad application of the commerce clause, they argue that the founders sought to create a limited federal government, and that Article I should be interpreted as providing a limited set of powers that Congress may exercise. This constrained reading of Congress's power is undermined by the more aggressive reading in the District of Columbia Context--the assertion that Congress must create a District to serve as the seat of the federal government.

Critics of DC statehood may also contend that the founders never intended for Washington D.C. to be a state, as Senator Mike Rounds did earlier in March:

The Founding Fathers never intended for Washington D.C. to be a state.#DCStatehood is really about packing the Senate with Democrats in order to pass a left-wing agenda.

Just look at the DC voter registration data:
🔵 76.4% Democrat
🔴 5.7% Republican

— Senator Mike Rounds (@SenatorRounds) March 22, 2021

Responses to this particular tweet have been largely cheeky--noting that Senator Rounds represents South Dakota, which was not a state at the time of the founding. These responses miss the point.

The response, instead, should be that based on what the Constitution says, it appears that there was an expectation that there would be a District, but whether that district would be DC, or whether it could ever change in size or location (other than remaining below 10 square miles) appears to be an open question. 

Moreover, proponents of originalist methodology should scold Senator Rounds for his shoddy attempt at engaging in originalist analysis. Virtually all originalist scholars will tell you that modern originalism focuses on the original public meaning of constitutional provisions--not on the intentions of the founders. When left-wing commentators refer to the original intent of the founders in criticizing originalism, they are met with a flurry of indignant responses from academic originalists. I haven't seen a similar set of responses to Senator Rounds' tweet though. Perhaps I missed them.

In the end, DC statehood is a political debate. Critics and proponents of statehood may try bringing the Constitution into the picture, but these efforts are misguided do nothing more than muddy the waters.

EDIT - APRIL 22, 2021

I have left out a discussion of whether DC statehood violates the 23rd Amendment, a secondary argument that the WSJ advances and that others focus on in more detail elsewhere. While I avoided discussion of the 23rd Amendment issue to save space, it is not apparent that DC statehood would violate the amendment, which grants DC electors in the electoral college. While the size of the district may be reduced, this would not undermine the appointment of electors. And DC statehood is certainly not inconsistent with the spirit of the 23rd Amendment, which is to grant political representation to those in the District--statehood would permit residents to have not only representation in executive elections, but in the legislature as well. If statehood passes and the three electoral votes for the shrunken district remain a widespread concern, the 23rd Amendment may be repealed should it be deemed no longer necessary.

Has President Trump Already Pardoned Roger Stone?

There are a lot of people out there who generally express reasonable opinions and seem normal, but who nevertheless are willing to entertain the odd outlandish belief. You may get through your workday without incident while believing that the world is flat, that we are living in a computer simulation, or that the spelling of "The Berenstain Bears" is evidence of a parallel universe. Indeed, you may believe all of these things and still get along just fine with your friends and coworkers.

I'm not here to judge you. Instead, desperate for distraction from quarantine and curfews, I've cooked up my own wild theory--a theory that I may have fooled myself into believing is true. Maybe I'm right. Or maybe I've just been stuck inside for too long.

News outlets have reported for some time, with renewed interest today, that President Trump may be about to pardon Roger Stone, who was sentenced to three years in prison back in February after being convicted of lying to authorities, obstructing a congressional investigation, and witness intimidation. My wild theory is that Stone has already been pardoned as a result of Trump's tweets.

From Politico, earlier today:

President Donald Trump on Thursday promised his longtime informal political adviser Roger Stone would not serve time in prison, revealing the convicted Republican provocateur “can sleep well at night” and reprising his fiery criticisms of former special counsel Robert Mueller’s probe. 

The pledge from the president came on Twitter, after Charlie Kirk, the founder of the conservative group Turning Point USA, wrote Tuesday that Stone “will serve more time in prison than 99% of these rioters destroying America” — referring to the ongoing nationwide protests over the killing of George Floyd, a 46-year-old black man, by a Minneapolis police officer. 

“This isn’t justice,” Kirk added. “RT for a full pardon of Roger Stone!” 

Trump went on to share the tweet Thursday morning, writing in his own accompanying message: “No. Roger was a victim of a corrupt and illegal Witch Hunt, one which will go down as the greatest political crime in history. He can sleep well at night!”

Here is the tweet:

No. Roger was a victim of a corrupt and illegal Witch Hunt, one which will go down as the greatest political crime in history. He can sleep well at night! https://t.co/HHg24tcZrx

— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) June 4, 2020

This is not the first time Trump has tweeted something like this. Kirk wrote a similar tweet criticizing Stone's conviction back in April, which also prompted a response from Trump:

This is a disgraceful situation! https://t.co/s2qZSrGw6U

— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) April 18, 2020

Politico and other outlets are reporting that Trump's tweet today appears to be a promise by Trump to pardon Roger Stone, as his suggestion that Stone "can sleep well at night" strongly suggests that Stone will not end up spending the night in prison (because he will be pardoned).

I'll go a step further and suggest that there's an argument to be made that this tweet itself (and his April tweet) constitute a pardon of Roger Stone. 

Connecticut Legislature to Consider Ban on "Distracted Walking"

The Hartford Courant reports on a "Distracted Walking" law that is making its way through Connecticut's legislature. From the report:

The General Assembly’s transportation committee was voting Wednesday on a bill that would make it a fineable offense to cross the street while looking at your cellphone.

“This is really about trying to protect the person who should be aware when they’re putting themselves in front of a two or three ton vehicle barreling at them … if they’re not paying attention they will lose that battle,” said Sen. Carlo Leone, D-Stamford and co-chair of the committee.

Rep. Roland Lemar, D-New Haven and the committee’s other co-chair, said he started out opposing the bill, reasoning that walkers “present the least danger” in terms of causing traffic accidents.

“As I heard from more and more people, this is a shared responsibility that we have,” he said. “We do have things like distracted driving, so distracted walking is a reasonable standard that we should establish.”

The bill is S.B. No. 825 and can be found here. The bill is of note because it is, to my knowledge, the first state-level legislation that would restrict the use of electronic devices while walking across streets. A few towns have passed restrictions like this, but I am not aware of any states that have done so.

From the text of the bill:

Section 1. (NEW) (Effective October 1, 2019) (a) For the purposes of this section, "mobile electronic device" means any hand-held or other portable electronic equipment capable of providing data communication between two or more persons, including, but not limited to, a mobile telephone, a text messaging device, a paging device, a personal digital assistant, a laptop computer, equipment that is capable of playing a video game or a digital video disk, or equipment on which digital photographs are taken or transmitted, or any combination thereof, and "viewing" means looking in the direction of the screen of a mobile electronic device.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, no pedestrian shall cross a highway while viewing a mobile electronic device.

(c) The provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall not apply to (1) the use of a mobile electronic device for the sole purpose of communicating with any of the following regarding an emergency situation: An emergency response operator, a hospital, physician's office or health clinic, an ambulance company, a fire department or a police department, or (2) any of the following persons while in the performance of their official duties and within the scope of their employment: A peace officer or firefighter, as those terms are defined in section 53a-3 of the general statutes, or any emergency medical responder, emergency medical technician or paramedic, as those terms are defined in section 19a-175 of the general statutes.

(d) Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall, for a first violation, receive a warning and, for any subsequent violation, be fined twenty dollars.

This restriction is narrower than Honolulu's ban (examined in painstaking detail here). Connecticut's proposed restriction applies to a smaller range of devices, as it includes the important qualification that a "mobile electronic device" affected by the bill must be capable of providing data communication between two or more persons. Honolulu's ban, on the other hand, applied to devices that either provided for communications between two or more people OR were capable of "providing amusement." This means that even if someone is fiddling with an iPod while crossing the street, they will not violate this law, provided that their iPod is a model that cannot send messages or texts to other people. Of course, it seems that no one (including me, for the most part) listens to music on anything other than their phones while walking anymore, but now there may be a reason to dust off the old devices.

Unlike Montclair, California's terribly-drafted ban, the Connecticut bill only applies to instances where pedestrians are "viewing" the device, which the bill defines as "looking in the direction of the screen of a mobile electronic device." Honolulu uses a similar definition. This is narrower than Montclair's ban, which also applies to listening to devices with headphones.

As I've noted before, I generally oppose restrictions like this. Bills that prohibit common practices like this are likely to be unequally enforced in light of widespread violations will occur, and enforcement will be left up to the discretion of law enforcement officers. Broad grants of discretion like this are likely to disproportionately impact racial minorities, the poor, and others who officers believe are "suspicious." While this bill isn't as broad as Montclair's ban, it is still more than is necessary. And, as I've also noted before, while proponents of the bill may argue that its twenty-dollar fine is low, this amount is still burdensome to some and it can add up for those who are repeatedly cited -- a likely occurrence for a prohibition on common activity.

And as for Rep. Roland Lemar's change of heart on the bill in light of restrictions on distracted driving, this ignores the fact that pedestrians are not the ones who are likely to cause harm to others if they are walking while distracted. Distracted driving rules make sense, as vehicles can cause significant injury or death if their drivers aren't paying attention. As for people who are walking, they may well end up injured if they are walking while distracted, but they are not going to injure others like distracted drivers. That Lemar cannot recognize this distinction is unsettling.

As for the status of the bill, on March 20, 2019, the Transportation Committee voted in favor of the bill, and as of today, the bill has been submitted to the Legislative Commissioner's Office. From there, it may be voted on by the legislature or it may proceed to a different committee (at least, that's what I've been able to grasp from this cheat sheet on Connecticut legislative procedure). Hopefully the bill will be referred to another committee to die, or the legislature will vote against it, as it is an unnecessary restriction that may prompt other states and towns to follow suit.

Iowa Senate Bill Would Require State Supreme Court Supermajority to Find Laws Unconstitutional

The Des Moines Register reports:

The Iowa Senate narrowly approved a controversial bill Tuesday that says no state law can be held unconstitutional by an Iowa court without the concurrence of at least five justices of the seven-member Iowa Supreme Court. 

Senate File 2282 was approved on a 26-24 vote, sending it to the Iowa House, where it faces an uncertain future. All the votes in favor were cast by Republicans, while the opposing votes came from 20 Democrats, one independent and three Republicans.

Here's the text of the bill:

Pursuant to the provisions of Article V, section 4 of the Constitution of the State of Iowa, the general assembly declares that no statute shall be held unconstitutional by a court of this state except by the concurrence of at least five justices of the supreme court of Iowa.

The Iowa Supreme Court is made up of seven justices, meaning that this bill would require a supermajority of justices to hold that a state law is unconstitutional. Additionally, the bill applies to statutes being held unconstitutional by "a court of this state," meaning that a statute cannot be deemed unconstitutional unless it is ultimately appealed to the Iowa Supreme Court where at least five justices agree that the law is unconstitutional.

This structure of the bill makes some sense, as it avoids the scenario where the Iowa Court of Appeals holds that a law is unconstitutional, and then becomes precedent because it is not appealed to the State Supreme Court. At the same time, the bill would have a strange effect on the status of Court of Appeals' opinions that are not taken up by the State Supreme Court -- as opinions finding state laws unconstitutional that are not reviewed by the Supreme Court would appear to run afoul of the law and therefore be invalid.

Democrats in the Republican-controlled state senate have spoken out against the law, arguing that it seizes power away from the Supreme Court. Republicans agree -- arguing that the courts should not have the power to overturn laws without this additional requirement. For some truly dense commentary, look no further than Senator Jason Schultz:

Sen. Jason Schultz, R-Schleswig, thanked [Senator Julian] Garrett for advancing the bill, saying it's a measure needed in this day and age. 

"Ladies and gentleman, this bill acknowledges that the Constitution is a contract; that the words do not change. What this bill does is say that we are not going to simply have a popularity contest on the constitutionality of a law," Schultz said.

While it isn't really related to the substantive issues, I'm going to break down Schultz's comment, as it demonstrates a stunning failure to grasp what the Senate is doing and how the the Court works. First, Schultz's assertion that the Constitution is a contract is not correct, as the Constitution is a set of rules that govern the basic functions of state government, and also sets forth individual rights that may be used to strike down laws. It's a set of rules that was enacted by popular vote -- not a contract.  Second, even if the Constitution is a contract, it's unclear how the law acknowledges this. Third, the words of the Constitution do change -- the Constitution can be amended.  Fourth, the bill does effectively say there will be a popularity contest on the constitutionality of law in that five, rather than four, justices can still hold a law unconstitutional. The law just has to be "more unpopular" if we are to adopt Schultz's misleading phrasing.

While I don't approve of the law, as it raises some unpleasant memories of woefully misguided backlash against the Court back in 2010, I don't agree with Democratic lawmakers who claim that the bill is unconstitutional. From the Register:

Sen. Matt McCoy, D-Des Moines, said he was troubled by the partisanship that had appeared to develop over the bill, as well as what he described as "the contempt that this Legislature has towards the courts." 

"I have news for you," McCoy said. "This is not going to be constitutional, and Iowans are going to be angry again at this effort to bring partisanship into this process. Make no mistake about it: This is about partisan politics. When the Legislature doesn't get its way, it punishes the courts."

While the bill certainly has an impact on the separation of powers, and while it certainly appears to be a partisan ploy, McCoy is not correct to imply that the bill violates the Iowa Constitution. Article V, Section Four of the Iowa Constitution states that the Iowa Supreme Court shall "constitute a court for the correction of errors at law, under such restrictions as the general assembly may, by law, prescribe." (emphasis added). This section indicates that the general assembly can place restrictions on the court's jurisdiction. This constitutional grant of power to the legislature is reaffirmed by Article V, Section 14, which states that the general assembly has the duty to "provide for a general system of practice in all the courts of this state," meaning that the legislature is charged with making court rules and enacting procedures.

Senate File 2282 would place a limit on the Iowa Supreme Court's ability to hold laws unconstitutional. It is a clear attempt by the legislature (which is now entirely controlled by Republicans) to limit the power of the Court. This attempt smacks of partisan politics, as Iowa conservatives likely still see the Court as a liberal institution following its 2009 decision in Varnum v. Brien striking down the state's law restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples. It's unfortunate to see such partisan fiddling with the mechanics of the legal system and I hope (though I am not optimistic) that the bill will fail in the Iowa House.

The Second Amendment and Legislative "Protection" of Constitutional Rights

This column in yesterday's Des Moines Register by the Editorial Board caught my eye. It begins:

Is state Rep. Chip Baltimore clairvoyant?

The Boone Republican was arrested last week, charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and possession of a firearm while under the influence of alcohol. Interestingly, less than 10 months ago, he voted to support legislation reducing penalties for toting a gun while drunk. Lucky for him, that bill was signed into law.

According to a police report, Baltimore was stopped by an Ames officer early Friday morning after authorities received reports of a reckless driver traveling northbound on Interstate Highway 35. With his slurred speech and bloodshot eyes, he told the officer he was on his way home after attending meetings in Des Moines, the report said.

. . .  

Last legislative session, Baltimore was among the lawmakers who supported the Iowa Omnibus Gun Law.

Before this law went into effect, carrying a firearm while intoxicated was an aggravated misdemeanor, punishable by up to two years in prison. An OWI conviction provided clear grounds for revocation of a permit to carry a weapon.

The new law, which went into effect July 1, cuts in half potential jail time and allows drunken drivers the ability to keep their permits to carry handguns.

At the time, one Iowa sheriff questioned the change, baffled that state legislators recognized the danger of operating a vehicle while drunk but not carrying a lethal weapon while intoxicated.


“We know alcohol blurs judgment,” said Black Hawk County Sheriff Tony Thompson. “I’m not sure what the driving force was behind watering that down.”

The Register's earlier article reporting Baltimore's arrest is here. Notably, Baltimore was stopped when an officer observed him driving at 55 mph in a 70 mph zone entering a 65 mph zone. For those interested in DUI-related trivia (who isn't?), the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration states that driving at 10 miles or more below the speed limit is an indicator of possible impaired driving. The same is not true of speeding.

 

This story is my quirky introduction for a much broader discussion of misleading rhetoric regarding the "protection" of constitutional rights through legislation. For those only interested in the adventures and apparent foresight of Chip Baltimore (and accompanying DUI trivia), stop reading now!

Don't Operate Drones While Drunk in New Jersey, and Other Crimes

Through this angrily-titled Reason article, "Good Riddance to Chris Christie," I learned about a recent law in New Jersey that creates several new drone-related crimes. The text of S3370, which Governor Christie signed into law on Monday, is available here.

The bill creates several new drone-related crimes. One of the more widely-reported restrictions is a ban on the operation of drones while under the influence of alcohol, narcotics, hallucinogens, "habit-producing" drugs, or with a blood alcohol level of 0.08% or more. This restriction has led to the publication of several articles that whimsically announce the restriction on "drunk droning" or "drinking and droning." I'm not sure if I'm ready to approve of these publications use of "drone" as a verb, as operating drones does not necessarily involve speaking at length in a boring manner, but the restriction is worth noting.

It's also worth mentioning that federal regulations already place even stricter alcohol-related restrictions on the commercial operation of drones. This concise explainer by Jonathan Rupprecht points out that commercial drone operators can't fly drones within eight hours of consuming alcohol or with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.04% or higher. Rupprecht also notes that hobbyist drone users that operate drones while intoxicated may run afoul of federal regulations if their activity is deemed to "threaten the safety of the national airspace system."

New Jersey bans more than the drunken operation of drones. The law also includes provisions prohibiting people from using drones while hunting, and from using drones to prevent people from hunting. The law also bans the operation of drones in "a manner that endangers the life or property of another," and prohibits people from using drones from conducting surveillance on correctional facilities or "endanger[ing] the safety or security" of these facilities by operating drones on their premises.

But wait, there's more!

The law creates an offense for drone users whose drones interfere with "first responders," (which include law enforcement officers, firefighter, ambulance operators, and others). California has attempted to pass similar legislation that would criminalize operating drones near fires, as this activity has reportedly hindered firefighting efforts. But these crimes have yet to become law in California due to Governor Jerry Brown's reluctance to expand California's bloated Penal Code. Governor Christie, however, appears to have no such qualms.

A final provision of note is a revision to the law governing the penalty of "parole supervision for life" that is imposed on certain sex offenders and those convicted of kidnapping pursuant to N.J.S.A. C.2C:43-6.4. The provision states that the parole supervision for life "may include reasonable conditions prohibiting or restricting the person's operation of an unmanned aircraft system in order to reduce the likelihood of a recurrence of criminal or delinquent behavior." While drones can (and occasionally have) been used to hover creepily outside of people's windows, this is a strangely specific provision to add to the various restrictions that sex offenders face.

I'm generally opposed to imposing restrictions on private drone users, as tortious or invasive behavior with drones could probably be prosecuted or litigated under more general existing laws. I do approve of legislative restrictions on government drone use, but New Jersey appears to have yet to impose such restrictions. The last attempt at doing so failed a year ago when Governor Christie failed to sign off on a bill that would have imposed a warrant restriction (with certain exceptions) on drone use by law enforcement agencies. Perhaps Governor Phil Murphy will act differently should a similar bill make its way through the legislature in the future.

Bacongate: Did Senator Leahy Read My Confirmation Hearing Outline for Justice Willett?

Business Insider reports on a ridiculous exchange between Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), and Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Judicial Nominee, Texas Supreme Court Justice Don Willett, a video of which is below:



Back when Justice Willet was being considered as a potential Supreme Court nominee, I wrote this post highlighting questions that could be asked at Willett's confirmation hearing based on his prior tweets. From that post, here is one of my potential questions (and the accompanying tweet):

As a Supreme Court Justice (or federal judge) would you be willing to expand the Supreme Court's previous decisions that expanded the definition of marriage?

I could support recognizing a constitutional right to marry bacon. pic.twitter.com/HKPW6tE4H6

— Justice Don Willett (@JusticeWillett) April 30, 2015

In a fascinating display of either: (1) failing to understand simple humor; or (2) extreme partisan interpretation, Leahy lambasted Willet's tweet as an attack on gay marriage and the Supreme Court's decision legalizing gay marriage. From Business Insider:

"I don't think one would see that as praising the Supreme Court decisions," Leahy said of the tweet.

While I am happy that I was able to predict at least one of the tweets that would come up in Willett's confirmation hearing, Leahy taking the tweet in this direction made a farce of his line of questioning. Senators with concerns about Willett taking conservative stances on legal issues certainly have plenty to work with, but this exchange is just (to use some legal terminology) goofy.

All of this aside, I will assume without evidence that Senator Leahy got the idea to ask about that tweet by reading my blog, and I thank the good Senator for his attention to my work.

Court Denies Sheriff Joe Arpaio's Request to Vacate All Orders and Dismiss Case Following Pardon

NPR reports:

U.S. District Judge Susan Ritchie Bolton says that President Trump's pardon of former Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio does not "revise the historical facts" of his case — and that she will not vacate her ruling that found Arpaio guilty of criminal contempt.

On Thursday, Bolton quoted Black's Law Dictionary to say that a pardon "releases the wrongdoer from punishment and restores the offender's civil rights without qualification." But she then added a further interpretation in her own words: "It does not erase a judgment of conviction, or its underlying legal and factual findings."

The NPR story contains a copy of the Order, but a complete copy of the Order can be found here. Additional coverage of this most recent development can be found here and here. Arpaio's attorneys have filed a notice of appeal of the ruling. My own discussion of the Arpaio pardon can be found here.

I do not have a time to do my own research on the law of pardons in the Ninth Circuit, but from the court's focus on the law of other circuits it appears that there does not seem to be any clean, controlling precedent in the Ninth Circuit. The court was not persuaded by Arpaio's reliance on U.S. v. Schaffer in which the DC Circuit vacated all orders following a pardon. The judge noted that due to the procedural background of Schaffer, the only issue pending was the court's grant of a new trial to Schaffer, which left Schaffer in a position "as if no trial had ever taken place." Accordingly, the seemingly broad order in Schaffer had a limited effect, which distinguished the ruling in Schaffer from Arpaio's broader request.

When this Order is appealed, I expect that the quick discussion in footnote one of the Order will be expanded upon. Here is the text of that footnote (with hyperlinks to the text of the cited cases added):

The United States Supreme Court originally signaled in dicta that a presidential pardon may have an expunging effect. See Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380-81 (1866) ("A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offence and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offence."). The Court later rejected this view. See Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 94 (1915) ("[A pardon] carries an imputation of guilt; acceptance a confession of it."). Other courts have followed suit. See, e.g., In re North, 62 F.3d 1434, 1436-37 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding Garland dicta not controlling); United States v. Noonan, 906 F.2d 952, 958-59 (3d Cir. 1990) (same); Bjerkan v. United States, 529 F.2d 125, 128 n.2 (7th Cir. 1975) (same).

As the case works its way up through appeals, I suspect that discussion of the Supreme Court precedents and their interactions will move from the footnotes to the text of whatever opinions result. And if the law in the Ninth Circuit addressing this pardon issue is as absent as it seems from Judge Bolton's order, it will be interesting to see how the Ninth Circuit addresses the issue. In the end, I suspect that the ruling will not be favorable to Arpaio, but if the Ninth Circuit takes a thorough approach to the analysis (see, e.g., the approach in Noonan), the decision could be a notable contribution to this rarely-litigated area of law.

Trump to Nominate Justice Don Willett for Fifth Circuit

So reports San Antonio Express-News:

President Trump on Thursday will nominate two conservatives from Texas with compelling personal stories to the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, according to a senior administrative official.

Texas Supreme Court Justice Don Willett was cited by Trump as a potential U.S. Supreme court pick during his presidential campaign. Dallas appellate lawyer James Ho is a former Texas solicitor general who has argued cases before state and federal courts.

Willett -- a prolific Twitter user whose wit with more than 96,000 followers and the title of Texas “Tweeter Laureate” --had gently mocked Trump in some tweets during the campaign for the White House.

The article has a collection of some of Justice Willett's "gently mock[ing]" tweets.

I had previously blogged about Justice Willett back in the heyday of speculation as to who Trump would nominate to fill the Supreme Court seat left vacant by the death of Justice Antonin Scalia. At the time, Justice Willett was on Trump's list of potential nominees, although Trump ultimately nominated now-Justice Neil Gorsuch to the Court.

It will be interesting to see whether Justice Willett faces heightened scrutiny in his confirmation hearing given his prior inclusion on Trump's list of potential Supreme Court nominees. Justice Willett also may have a wider public profile than some of Trump's other nominees in light of his active, and often humorous, Twitter account. This, coupled with existing dissatisfaction by Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee may lead to some interesting exchanges whenever the hearings end up taking place.

Talking in Public: A Cautionary Tale for Lawyers

Kenneth Vogel of The New York Times has this remarkable story that should serve as a cautionary tale for all attorneys who may feel tempted to speak about their cases and clients outside of the office. Vogel reports that he was getting lunch with a source in a Washington DC restaurant, when he noticed Ty Cobb, the attorney retained by the White House to assist in responding to various Russia investigations, having a conversation with John Dowd, Trump's "lead outside counsel in the Russia investigations."

Mr. Cobb was not difficult to notice, on account of his incredible moustache:

Mr. Cobb chose to discuss his work in representing the White House in the Russia investigations, and apparently talked loudly and extensively enough about his work to give rise to this story detailing the conflict among Trump's attorneys over the proper level of cooperation in the Russia investigations.

From Vogel's article describing how he got the scoop:

I ordered yet another iced tea, and continued typing away, as Mr. Cobb and Mr. Dowd delved deeper, not paying me any mind.

They discussed presidential privilege and its effect on document production, tensions on the legal team and their colleagues. Mr. Cobb suggested one colleague was not on the president’s good side, but added, “I’m trying to get the president not to pick a fight with her.”

Finally, after more than 45 minutes of my assiduously listening to their conversation by myself, Mr. Cobb picked up the check and announced to Mr. Dowd, “All right, boss, I got to roll back to my little hole. I’ve got like a seven and a half foot ceiling ... Wilt Chamberlain couldn’t stand up in it.”

Attorneys are often warned during training or in law firm policies to avoid discussing matters related to their work in public settings. Whether it is in a restaurant, on the sidewalk, or in the elevator, attorneys should avoid discussing clients and cases, as any information communicated to lawyers is privileged, and attorneys' strategies and theories are protected by the work product doctrine. Speaking up about privileged information in a public setting is a very easy way for an attorney to run into serious problems.

Warnings against public discussion of work are often confined to the hypothetical elevator or restaurant. But Vogel's article gives a spectacular real-world example of what attorneys everywhere should avoid doing.