Shaun Martin posts at the California Appellate Report about the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in
Schwirse v. OCWP.
Martin’s post focuses on the facts
of the case, so I will not repeat them here in depth. The main takeaways are: (1) Schwirse, a drunken
longshoreman, fell at work and is seeking reimbursement for his injury, arguing
that his injury was not "occasioned solely" by his intoxication, (2) contrary to everything I have heard over the past two years, law may not be
the drunkest profession, and (3) the timeless warning that you should not drink
beer before whiskey has gained yet another supporting anecdote.
I (bore that I am) want to add a comment on the
issue of statutory interpretation present in this case. This case involves “LHWCA” which serves a
double function as: (1) the acronym for the Longshore and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act and (2) what Schwirse probably said when he fell six feet onto
a concrete and steel ledge while relieving himself. The LHWCA presumes that longshoremen are due
compensation for injuries suffered on the job, but there is a clever exception:
this presumption does not exist if there is substantial evidence that the
injury was occasioned solely by the intoxication of the injured employee.
Schwirse advanced the ingenious argument his injury was not occasioned solely by
his intoxication. While his intoxication
caused his accident (the fall), the injury (a lacerated scalp) was caused
by his colliding with the concrete ledge.
While the alcohol played a role, it was not the sole cause of the
injury.
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, noting
that this interpretation would render the LHWCA’s intoxication exception “insignificant,
if not wholly superfluous.” In light of
the various perils a drunken longshoreman would face on the docks, I am leaning
towards the “wholly superfluous” conclusion.
As a final remark on the case, I think that law
students everywhere would be better off if this case were added to statutory
interpretation casebooks to illustrate the principle that statutes should be
interpreted in a manner that avoids rendering portions of the statute
superfluous. Somebody should also tell
Justice Scalia, in case he wants to release a second edition of Reading Law.
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