City of Baguio To Again Consider Distracted Walking Ordinance

By now, it should be clear to readers of this blog that I have a Google alert set up to notify me of proposed laws or ordinances related to bills restricting "distracted walking," a practice typically defined as walking while looking at a cell phone or other electronic device (almost always while walking across streets).

Yesterday's notification brought me news from the City of Baguio in the Philippines. The City Council has calendared for second reading an ordinance that will restrict pedestrians from walking across streets while distracted. The Philippine News Agency reports:

The city council here is hearing a proposed ordinance, authored by the Councilor Scout Official For a Day (SOFAD), that prohibits and regulates the use of mobile devices and other distractive devices while walking and crossing the streets and sidewalks to ensure public safety.

“The said ordinance aims to prohibit pedestrian walkers (from using) any distract(ive) tools that could lead them to an accident," Councilor Peter Fianza, member of the Committee on Public Protection, Safety, Peace and Order, said in an interview Tuesday.
The proposal was calendared for second reading during Monday’s regular council session.

Fianza said once approved, the ordinance requires all pedestrians to be vigilant when they walk on the street and not to use gadgets, such as mobile phones, books and other objects “that distract someone’s line of sight.”

What is this about a Councilor Scout Official For a Day?

The city government has institutionalized the scouting program during October, annually giving boy and girl scouts, from elementary to high school who are enrolled in private or public schools, to sit as officials for a day after a screening process conducted by the Girl and Boy Scouts of the Philippines.

I see. Well, since there is no link to the ordinance, and since the City website's link to the legislative monitoring system appears to be broken, do we know exactly what kind of conduct the ordinance bans, and, in particular, whether the ordinance defines "distractive devices?"

[I'm afraid not. Like nearly all journalists, I refuse to put a link to the text of the ordinance in my story even though this would be very helpful to readers, particularly those who read and apply laws for a living and who may provide more in-depth commentary on the law or case being discussed].

Shoot. Well do we at least know what sort of punishment there would be for a violation of this ordinance? I'd guess that the penalties aren't that high, since comparable laws and proposals in the United States only involve relatively low fines like $20.00 per violation.

Once approved as an ordinance, violators will be meted a penalty of a PHP1,000 fine or render community service for the first offense . . .

Okay, PHP1,000 seems to be about $19.00 in US dollars--

. . . PHP2,000 and community service for the second offense or one to 10 days imprisonment; and PHP2,500 and community service or imprisonment of 11 to 30 days for the third offense.

Ouch! Where would someone get an idea for a law like this in the first place?

Fianza said the concept of the proposed ordinance was based on the anti-distracted walking measure in Honolulu, Hawaii.

As far as I can tell, Honolulu was the first city in the United States to ban "distracted walking" while crossing the street, and it has kicked off a bit of a trend of other cities and at least one state (Connecticut) considering or enacting similar bans. This is the first instance of which I am aware where a city in a different country has proposed a similar ban that is explicitly inspired by Honolulu's ban.

Notably, though, this is not the first time a ban like this has been proposed in Baguio. The Herald Express reported in December 2017 that City Councilor Leandro B. Yangot, Jr. proposed a similar ban, although that report indicated that the measure would prohibit a person from crossing "a street or highway while viewing a mobile electronic device in a manner that averts his or her visual attention to the said device." Again, this is only a quote from the report, as I cannot locate the text of that previous ordinance. The penalties for that 2017 proposed ordinance would have been:

[C]ommunity service of 15 days for the first offense, community service of 30 days for the second offense, and a fine of P5,000 or imprisonment or both, upon the discretion of the court, for the third offense.

Tough, although I presume that this previous ordinance did not pass in light of the recent, similar proposed ordinance. The old proposal was at least a little more narrow, however, as the most recent proposal would ban looking at objects like books in addition to the typical phone or electronic device.

Without the text of the ordinance, there is not much more for me to say other than to repeat my point that such bills are misguided because they ban common practices and will likely lead to selective enforcement. They also will likely not deter people from walking while distracted, because the danger of being struck by a vehicle is apparently not enough of a deterrence. This most recent proposed ordinance is particularly notable as an example of how lawmaking in the United States -- including silly lawmaking -- may have an expansive impact, not only in other American cities and states, but in other parts of the world.

A 59-Line Breyer Question

Following up on my prior monitoring of the length of Breyer questions, yesterday's oral argument in Lamone v. Benisek prompted the following question/hypothetical from Justice Breyer:

This 59-line Breyer "question," or "Breyer Page" appears to be a new record, as the last record I've been able to locate was a 57-line Breyer Page in Gill v. Texas that Josh Blackman flagged back in 2017. Audio of the argument is not yet available, so I do not know yet if this is the longest Breyer Question ever asked in terms of length of time.

Connecticut Legislature to Consider Ban on "Distracted Walking"

The Hartford Courant reports on a "Distracted Walking" law that is making its way through Connecticut's legislature. From the report:

The General Assembly’s transportation committee was voting Wednesday on a bill that would make it a fineable offense to cross the street while looking at your cellphone.

“This is really about trying to protect the person who should be aware when they’re putting themselves in front of a two or three ton vehicle barreling at them … if they’re not paying attention they will lose that battle,” said Sen. Carlo Leone, D-Stamford and co-chair of the committee.

Rep. Roland Lemar, D-New Haven and the committee’s other co-chair, said he started out opposing the bill, reasoning that walkers “present the least danger” in terms of causing traffic accidents.

“As I heard from more and more people, this is a shared responsibility that we have,” he said. “We do have things like distracted driving, so distracted walking is a reasonable standard that we should establish.”

The bill is S.B. No. 825 and can be found here. The bill is of note because it is, to my knowledge, the first state-level legislation that would restrict the use of electronic devices while walking across streets. A few towns have passed restrictions like this, but I am not aware of any states that have done so.

From the text of the bill:

Section 1. (NEW) (Effective October 1, 2019) (a) For the purposes of this section, "mobile electronic device" means any hand-held or other portable electronic equipment capable of providing data communication between two or more persons, including, but not limited to, a mobile telephone, a text messaging device, a paging device, a personal digital assistant, a laptop computer, equipment that is capable of playing a video game or a digital video disk, or equipment on which digital photographs are taken or transmitted, or any combination thereof, and "viewing" means looking in the direction of the screen of a mobile electronic device.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, no pedestrian shall cross a highway while viewing a mobile electronic device.

(c) The provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall not apply to (1) the use of a mobile electronic device for the sole purpose of communicating with any of the following regarding an emergency situation: An emergency response operator, a hospital, physician's office or health clinic, an ambulance company, a fire department or a police department, or (2) any of the following persons while in the performance of their official duties and within the scope of their employment: A peace officer or firefighter, as those terms are defined in section 53a-3 of the general statutes, or any emergency medical responder, emergency medical technician or paramedic, as those terms are defined in section 19a-175 of the general statutes.

(d) Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall, for a first violation, receive a warning and, for any subsequent violation, be fined twenty dollars.

This restriction is narrower than Honolulu's ban (examined in painstaking detail here). Connecticut's proposed restriction applies to a smaller range of devices, as it includes the important qualification that a "mobile electronic device" affected by the bill must be capable of providing data communication between two or more persons. Honolulu's ban, on the other hand, applied to devices that either provided for communications between two or more people OR were capable of "providing amusement." This means that even if someone is fiddling with an iPod while crossing the street, they will not violate this law, provided that their iPod is a model that cannot send messages or texts to other people. Of course, it seems that no one (including me, for the most part) listens to music on anything other than their phones while walking anymore, but now there may be a reason to dust off the old devices.

Unlike Montclair, California's terribly-drafted ban, the Connecticut bill only applies to instances where pedestrians are "viewing" the device, which the bill defines as "looking in the direction of the screen of a mobile electronic device." Honolulu uses a similar definition. This is narrower than Montclair's ban, which also applies to listening to devices with headphones.

As I've noted before, I generally oppose restrictions like this. Bills that prohibit common practices like this are likely to be unequally enforced in light of widespread violations will occur, and enforcement will be left up to the discretion of law enforcement officers. Broad grants of discretion like this are likely to disproportionately impact racial minorities, the poor, and others who officers believe are "suspicious." While this bill isn't as broad as Montclair's ban, it is still more than is necessary. And, as I've also noted before, while proponents of the bill may argue that its twenty-dollar fine is low, this amount is still burdensome to some and it can add up for those who are repeatedly cited -- a likely occurrence for a prohibition on common activity.

And as for Rep. Roland Lemar's change of heart on the bill in light of restrictions on distracted driving, this ignores the fact that pedestrians are not the ones who are likely to cause harm to others if they are walking while distracted. Distracted driving rules make sense, as vehicles can cause significant injury or death if their drivers aren't paying attention. As for people who are walking, they may well end up injured if they are walking while distracted, but they are not going to injure others like distracted drivers. That Lemar cannot recognize this distinction is unsettling.

As for the status of the bill, on March 20, 2019, the Transportation Committee voted in favor of the bill, and as of today, the bill has been submitted to the Legislative Commissioner's Office. From there, it may be voted on by the legislature or it may proceed to a different committee (at least, that's what I've been able to grasp from this cheat sheet on Connecticut legislative procedure). Hopefully the bill will be referred to another committee to die, or the legislature will vote against it, as it is an unnecessary restriction that may prompt other states and towns to follow suit.

The Supreme Court Will Hear the First Major Second Amendment Case in Nearly a Decade

On Tuesday, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case challenging the constitutionality of New York City's regulations that restrict the carrying of firearms outside the home. The New York Times and Wall Street Journal have more reporting on the background of the case. From the New York Times:

The Supreme Court said on Tuesday that it would review a New York City gun law that limits residents from transporting their guns outside their homes, its first Second Amendment case in nearly a decade and a test of the court’s approach to gun rights after the arrival of Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh in October. 

Justice Kavanaugh, who replaced the more moderate Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and created a reliable five-member conservative majority, has an expansive view of gun rights. His presence most likely means that the Supreme Court will start exploring and perhaps expanding the scope of the Second Amendment.

The case is New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. City of New York, and the petitioners challenging New York's rule are an organization and several individual gun owners. The Second Circuit opinion that is being appealed is here.

New York Penal Law section 400.00(2)(a) and (f) provide for "premises" licenses and "carry" licenses for handguns. New York City's Rule regarding premises licenses states:

(a) Premises License – Residence or Business. This is a restricted handgun license, issued for a specific business or residence location. The handgun shall be safeguarded at the specific address indicated on the license. This license permits the transporting of an unloaded handgun directly to and from an authorized small arms range/shooting club, secured unloaded in a locked container. Ammunition shall be carried separately. (38 RCNY § 5-01(a)

This rule contains a number of restrictions, including that handguns be transported unloaded in a locked container, that ammunition be carried separately, and that handguns may be transported to "authorized" shooting ranges. The City acknowledges that there are seven authorized ranges in New York City. Holders of premises licenses are restricted from transporting firearms to shooting ranges outside of the city or to second homes, even if they are within the city (as this destination is not "an authorized small arms range/shooting club."

The Court has refused to take up Second Amendment cases since its 2010 ruling in McDonald v. City of Chicago in which it held that the Second Amendment's protections apply to the states. The Court had previously held in its 2008 ruling in District of Columbia v. Heller that the Second Amendment creates an individual right and that its core protection was of the possession of firearms for self-defense in the home. Since then, lower courts have applied a variety of approaches to the Second Amendment, as many of the cases they have confronted have involved rules or restrictions affecting the possession or carrying of firearms outside of the home. Noting Heller's statement limiting the core possession to self-defense in the home, and also noting language stating that the case should not cast doubt on other, "longstanding" restrictions on firearms, lower courts have typically restricted the scope of the Second Amendment. The Supreme Court has consistently refused to review these decisions -- including cases involving the carrying of firearms.

This is now likely to change, as there are now four conservative justices with expansive views of Second Amendment protections. These four justices create a block of four votes required to grant review of lower courts' decisions.

Justice Thomas, in particular, has consistently dissented from the Court's prior refusals to take up Second Amendment cases. He has been joined in these prior dissents by Justice Gorsuch (in this case involving California's restrictions on the carrying of firearms). Justice Alito likely shares Thomas's views, as reflected in his concurring-in-the-judgment opinion in Caetano v. Massachusetts, in which Alito (joined by Thomas) criticized the reasoning of the lower court opinion and argued that the Second Amendment's protection encompasses the possession of weapons commonly used today for self-defense. (As an aside, commentators will likely point to Alito's 1996 dissent from a case upholding a ban on machine guns, but that dissent is not particularly useful, as his analysis focuses on the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, and not on the Second Amendment). Justice Kavanaugh is likely to join Thomas, Gorsuch, and Alito in seeking a broad ruling on Second Amendment protections, as he has previously ruled that prohibitions on semi-automatic firearms are unconstitutional. (See page 46 of this opinion for the start of Kavanaugh's dissenting opinion while he was still on the DC Circuit).

Some commentators argue that the Supreme Court will likely overturn the Second Circuit's opinion and broaden the scope of Second Amendment protections. Mark Joseph Stern argues this in this Slate article and Garrett Epps makes a similar point over at The Atlantic. Both articles have exaggerated titles (Stern's claims that the Court will make all states' laws like Texas' laws and Epps' title raises the notion of "Supersizing" the Second Amendment). But the tone of each article suggests that these goofy titles are likely the choice of editors rather than the authors.

Stern writes:

The case thus marks an effort to inch the Supreme Court toward establishing a right to public carry without forcing the justices to tear down hundreds of laws in a single, sweeping ruling. For a decade, gun advocates have been stymied by the language in Heller and McDonald expressly limiting the Second Amendment to firearms “in the home.” The conservative justices, however, will probably use New York State Rifle to blur that line.

 And Epps notes:

The Rifle & Pistol case begins, then, with four virtually certain votes against the New York law—the two newcomers, Thomas, and Alito. Chief Justice John Roberts voted for the gun owners in Heller and McDonald. He may have been trying to keep the Court out of the Second Amendment area for institutional reasons since then, but that’s not likely to make him go back on his earlier votes when the time comes to throw down. 

“The impact of this case could be huge,” [Law Professor Adam] Winkler told me, because the Court may decide that the right to gun possession extends outside the home. The Court could undermine long-standing restrictions on concealed carry in America’s major cities, leading to hundreds of thousands more guns on the streets of Los Angeles, New York, and Washington, D.C.

Like Stern and Epps, I think that it's likely that the Court will overturn the Second Circuit opinion and strike down the New York City rule. The question then becomes how broad the Court's opinion will be. The New York City rule has several levels on which the justices may rule. A narrow ruling would overturn the rule based on its destination restriction, which prohibits premises license holders from taking their handguns anywhere other than an authorized shooting range. A broader ruling could strike down the law because it prohibits these license holders from carrying the handguns in a locked container separate from the ammunition. Such a broad ruling may be complicated by New York's alternate permit schemes -- which include concealed carry permits -- but there may be ways around this, such as a ruling striking down the locked container portion of the requirement only, while leaving the separate ammunition component intact.

There is also the question of how a broad determination of the Second Amendment's protection can make its way into the opinion. My first instinct, from looking at the layout of the Court and -- in particular -- Chief Justice Roberts's likely goal to avoid large changes in the law, is that there will likely be a majority opinion of Roberts, Alito, Gorsuch, Thomas, and Kavanaugh that overturns the law for its destination restriction, and a concurring opinion of the latter four justices that argues that the locked-case / no ammunition restriction is also impermissible.

A less-likely alternative is that Roberts will author an opinion that includes dicta that lays the foundation for a broader Second Amendment protection scheme. This would be similar to the paragraph in the Heller opinion that stated that "longstanding" restrictions on firearms (such as restrictions of criminals' possession of guns and prohibiting firearms in government buildings) were not cast into doubt by the opinion -- a paragraph that was reportedly added to gain Justice Kennedy's vote -- and which formed the basis of many restrictive lower court opinions in subsequent years. I think that an approach with language that leans in the opposite direction and calls for more Second Amendment protections is unlikely, as the most conservative justices will still join in the narrower majority opinion even if they write their own concurrence.

However the outcome may look in the end, it is likely that the Court will overrule the lower decision and, in doing so, hold that the Second Amendment provides at least some level of protection to the carrying of firearms beyond the home. However narrow the opinion is framed, this opinion would significantly broaden the scope of Second Amendment protections, and would likely lead to much more successful litigation against states and localities with strict restrictions on the carrying of firearms.

A Lottery Winnings Contract Hypothetical

Due to the overzealous sharing of dubious content, this Facebook Post showed up on my news feed earlier this evening. Here's a photo of the post:

Unless you expand the photo, the writing may be difficult to read. The photo shows several Mega Millions lottery tickets under the following text:

October 22, 2018
Mega Millions Proposition
I Christopher Ferry, herby [sic] agree to equally share 100% of the earnings I win from the Mega Millions drawing on Tuesday, October 23rd, 2018 with all parties that like, share and comment on my Facebook post that states this propostiion [sic]. This is an official legal document that can be used in the court of law. 

It's then signed, presumably by Christopher Ferry. The writing is in all capital letters, so I took the liberty of guessing at the intended capitalization rather than hurt your eyes.

After liking, sharing and commenting on the post (just kidding), I made the foolish mistake of reading the comments. There seem to be many people out there on the Internet who are confused about the basics of contract law. 

To those confused souls, I now say, you're welcome.

A surprising number of very confident commenters on the post noted that the document was not legally binding because it was not notarized. This is nonsense. While notarization may be required for certain documents or agreements, parties can enter into contracts with each other without notarization. Take, for example, oral agreements, or the website terms of service for reading this blog post, which state that by reading this I now own a small, yet noticeable percentage of your soul and that you are required to enter into binding arbitration with me to prove otherwise. This story of a winning lawsuit to claim a portion of lottery winnings as a result of a verbal agreement is yet another example. People can, and do, enter into non-notarized contracts every day. 

A smaller number of commenters speculated that the document may not be legally binding because it had numerous spelling errors. While spelling errors may occasionally be of legal significance (by misidentifying parties or terms, or injecting vagueness into the agreement), the errors here do not appear to have this effect. If spelling errors meant doom for legal documents, than a disturbingly massive percentage of contracts, pleadings, and judicial opinions would be rendered void.

Some other folks point out that the document is not legally binding because there is only one signature on it. A contract, they think, needs to be signed by all parties that are bound by it. This does not appear to be the case here, however, as Ferry's post is an offer that invites acceptance by performance. Ferry indicates that to accept his offer of sharing the earnings he receives, a party need only "like, share and comment on my Facebook post that states this propostiion [sic]." Once a party has done that, that person or entity will have fulfilled their end of the agreement.

On a related note, if Ferry ends up winning, a likely way he will whittle down the number of those who may have a claim against him will be to refuse to compensate anyone who did not completely perform their side of the agreement. Ferry notably requires that parties "like, share and comment" on the post, so anyone who only likes, or only comments would not have fulfilled their end of the bargain. His comments could make this issue a little more interesting, as he states that only those who "LIKE / SHARE / COMMENT" are eligible -- but these comments are parol evidence which some courts may deem inadmissible (particularly since the terms of the contract itself are fairly clear). And even if Ferry's comments are considered, they do not appear to contradict the terms of the agreement.

In short, the offer may give rise to a binding contract, provided that the party claiming to accept the offer has liked, shared, and commented on the post.

Unfortunately for Ferry, if he wins anything in the lottery, he will be required to share those winnings with anyone who fulfilled the requirements that he posted. Whether that is $1.6 billion or $2.00 -- Ferry agreed to share "100% of the earnings" that he would win, rather than limiting his performance only to a situation in which he won the jackpot. At the time of this writing, there are only about 30 minutes to go, but it will be interesting to see if Ferry wins a substantial amount, but less than the jackpot, as this may be enough for certain delightful people on the Internet to seek to recover their $1.32 to which they are entitled.

It's also fun that Ferry states that the document "can be used in the court of law." 

Good luck to Mr. Ferry, and to all others out there who, like me, are excited for their inevitable life of leisure once the winning numbers are announced.

New California Law on Care of Pets in Divorce Proceedings

The San Diego Union-Tribune reports that California recently passed a law (AB 22764) clarifying how courts may take into account care of pets in determining who will receive them following divorce proceedings.

The text of the new section 2605 of the Family Code (which will go into effect on January 1, 2019) is as follows:

2605. (a) The court, at the request of a party to proceedings for dissolution of marriage or for legal separation of the parties, may enter an order, prior to the final determination of ownership of a pet animal, to require a party to care for the pet animal. The existence of an order providing for the care of a pet animal during the course of proceedings for dissolution of marriage or for legal separation of the parties shall not have any impact on the court’s final determination of ownership of the pet animal. 

(b) Notwithstanding any other law, including, but not limited to, Section 2550, the court, at the request of a party to proceedings for dissolution of marriage or for legal separation of the parties, may assign sole or joint ownership of a pet animal taking into consideration the care of the pet animal. 

(c) For purposes of this section, the following definitions shall apply: 

(1) “Care” includes, but is not limited to, the prevention of acts of harm or cruelty, as described in Section 597 of the Penal Code, and the provision of food, water, veterinary care, and safe and protected shelter. 

(2) “Pet animal” means any animal that is community property and kept as a household pet.

Prior to the passage of this law, pets were deemed community property to be split equally among the parties to the proceedings. Now, courts have a formal basis for considering which of the parties to the divorce fed the pet, took the pet to the vet, or cared for the pet in other ways in determining which of the parties should get custody.

Notably, subsection (c)(2) specifies that this law only applies to pets that are "community property," so this law does not apply to pets that either of the parties may have had before the marriage. As for pets that both parties bought or adopted together, but before they were married, this could be complicated. If one of the parties paid for the pet, the court may well view that pet as that party's separate property. If the parties adopted the pet from a farm in northwest Iowa without making any payments, this could make things more difficult to determine. The parties could also agree in writing that a pet owned prior to the marriage is deemed community property following the marriage.

All of this seems very complicated, so the California legislature would do well to pass a law clarifying the disposition of pets obtained by two people in a relationship before the marriage. A simple solution would be preferable, such as (just off the top of my head) a law that the pet should go to the third party the married parties know from law school who frequently cares for the pet while the married parties are out of town. That law has yet to materialize, but at least for now, judges have a formal basis to consider care of pets when determining who gets custody.

Did the Supreme Court Just Overrule Korematsu?

The Supreme Court upheld Trump's travel ban this morning.  From the Wall Street Journal:

The court, in a 5-4 opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts, said Tuesday that Mr. Trump didn’t violate the law last September when he put in place restrictions on U.S. entry by people from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria and Yemen, a measure he said was necessary to protect national security because those countries don’t provide sufficient information for U.S. officials to assess whether their nationals are a threat. It was his third version of the much-debated ban, earlier iterations of which had been struck down in various parts by the courts. 

Chief Justice Roberts wrote that U.S. immigration law clearly gives the president “broad discretion to suspend the entry of aliens into the United States.” He added, “The president lawfully exercised that discretion based on his findings—following a worldwide, multi-agency review—that entry of the covered aliens would be detrimental to the national interest.”

I am too busy to look into the ruling in depth, and commentators will be dissecting it for days and weeks to come.

But I have seen debate on Twitter as to whether the Court overruled Korematsu v. United States -- a decision that affirmed the United States government's relocation of citizens of Japanese dissent to internment camps during World War II.  I have previously blogged about how Korematsu has been treated as precedent in subsequent cases.

Today's ruling included strong language regarding the case:

The dissent’s reference to Korematsu, however, affords this Court the opportunity to make express what is already obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—“has no place in law under the Constitution.” 323 U. S., at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

Some commentators think that this means Korematsu no longer has precedential value and has been overruled:

OK, Westlaw. Time to hang a red flag on Korematsu. https://t.co/EfjaZxIRwt

— John Elwood (@johnpelwood) June 26, 2018

But others disagree:

Guys, Korematsu was not "overruled" today. Saying it "has been overruled in the court of history" is a clever way of making it sound like you've overruled it, but the question wasn't presented and no overruling actually occurred. Disavowed maybe, but not overruled. #SCOTUS

— Jason P. Steed (@5thCircAppeals) June 26, 2018

On the "court of history" issue, it's worth noting that the Court has only once referred to the "court of history" (distinct from "courts of history"). From New York Times Co. v. Sullivan:

Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history. Fines levied in its prosecution were repaid by Act of Congress on the ground that it was unconstitutional. See, e. g., Act of July 4, 1840, c. 45, 6 Stat. 802, accompanied by H. R. Rep. No. 86, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. (1840). (emphasis added).

As the only prior use of this term was to distinguish an issue that the Court had never directly addressed, I see Jason Steed's point. But the Court also notes that the decision "has not place in law under the Constitution," which may be a strong way of stating that the case is overruled. Unfortunately, the Court's effort "to be clear," did not include the explicit statement that Korematsu was, in fact, overruled by the Supreme Court, and in light of the imprecise language (and Steed's further point that the Court also stated that Korematsu "has nothing to do with this case"), the debate over Korematsu's precedential status may continue.