Section Three, Originalism, and Interpretive Alternatives

William Baude and Michael Stokes Paulsen have written a recent article, "The Sweep and Force of Section Three," in which they argue that Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment is a self-executing provision that renders Donald Trump ineligible for the presidency as a result of his role in attempting to overthrow the results of the 2020 election.

The article has been the talk of both legal academia and the wider public in recent weeks, drawing a great deal of attention and drawing support and criticism from various scholars and commentators. While this post adds to the commentary, let me emphasize at the outset that I do not dig into the weeds of the historical claims or evidence that Baude and Paulsen amass. Indeed, this post isn't so much a response to the article, but instead derives primarily from how Baude and Paulsen have described and defended their claims in follow-up discussions (particularly in recent episodes of "Amarica's Constitution," which Baude highlights here), and have only reviewed portions of the article that get into the interpretive issues I focus on here.

This was initially meant to be a response to a brief comment Michael Ramsey's post at The Originalism Blog, which highlighted some recent coverage of Baude and Paulsen's article. Ramsey closes his post with this comment:

There's a lot of originalism in these debates and in commentary on the Section 3 issues generally. It's worth noting that the nonoriginalist alternative is that judges decide whether Trump should be disqualified based on their intuitive assessment of what's best in light of modern needs and circumstances.

This characterization of the options for interpreting Section Three is an oversimplification. And it's an oversimplification worth highlighting because of its frequent occurrence in debates between originalists and nonoriginalists--including in Baude and Paulsen's defense of their claims against certain critiques.

Contrary to Ramsey's claim, there are a number of nonoriginalist means by which one may interpret Section Three before resorting to mere intuitive assessments. A judge might interpret the text by reference to its present meaning and understanding, as well as how it fits in with the structure of the Fourteenth Amendment and the rest of the Constitution, without looking to the historical debates over the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning and place in the Constitution. Alternatively, a judge may look to how Section Three has been interpreted in subsequent cases and rely on meaning developed over time through common law reasoning to determine how that language should be applied in a present case. And while "intuitive assessment" of modern needs suggests little more than going with one's gut, or shooting from the hip based on initial impressions, considerations of modern needs and circumstances--albeit through thorough consideration of consequences and careful reasoning--may also play a role, as those espousing pragmatist theories of interpretation argue at length.

And even the method that Ramsey highlights is one worth noting. As concerning as "intuitive assessment" might sound, considering modern needs and circumstances probably ought to play at least some role in the decisionmaking process--even if those considerations factor in on a level beyond interpretation. Even if there's a strong originalist argument in favor of disqualification, one shouldn't lose sight of the broader context. Indeed, another originalist, Michael McConnell, urges a narrow reading of Section Three out of concern for the consequences of a broad reading:

Putting together my friends' broad definitions of "insurrection" and "engage," and lack of concern about enforcement procedure, I worry that this approach could empower partisans to seek disqualification every time a politician supports or speaks in support of the objectives of a political riot. Imagine how bad actors will use this theory. If that is what Section 3 necessarily means, we have to live with it. But in my opinion, we should seek the narrowest, most precise, least susceptible to abuse, definition that is consistent with history and precedent. In the absence of actual engagement in actual insurrection, judged as such by competent authorities, we should allow the American people to vote for the candidates of their choice.

Baude and Paulsen respond by arguing that this is an inappropriate way to interpret the Constitution (both in the initial link and in this second episode as well). They argue that concerns over misapplication of a particular interpretation do not invalidate the criticized interpretation, and analogize McConnell's concerns over consequences to a judge's first selecting a preferred result and then structuring an interpretive method that ensures the result. Instead, they argue, one should engage in principled interpretation to figure out what the Constitution truly means, and follow that meaning from there, even if it might lead to unexpected or undesirable consequences.

Baude and Paulsen take this position in their article as well. Here's an example of this point from their article, in which they critique Chief Justice (or, in this case, Circuit Justice) Chase's opinion in In re Griffin:

Chase’s construe-to-avoid-the-force-of-constitutional-language-whose-policy-consequences-you-dislike approach to constitutional interpretation is simply wrong. Judges do not get to rewrite constitutional provisions they find objectionable on policy grounds. Relatedly, judges do not get to make up new provisions of law in order to devise policy “solutions” to texts they don’t like. Chase’s opinion imposed, as a solution to textual literalism and its real and imagined policy inconveniences, a different kind of constitutional provision, one more like the Impeachment Clause and the Treason Clause. Put bluntly, Chase made up law that was not there in order to change law that was there but that he did not like. (p. 40)

As Baude and Paulsen advance this argument--both in the excerpt above, and in responding to McConnell's critique--they tend to treat concern over consequences as something distinct from a theory of interpretation. This, at least, is the impression I get when they claim to be following the Constitution's meaning wherever it will lead, rather than letting consequences dictate how the Constitution ought to be given effect. In particular, they argue that originalist interpretation--looking to the original public meaning of the Constitution--is the way to go, and pragmatic considerations are something other than interpretation entirely. Ramsey's characterization of "intuitive assessments" of modern needs suggests this as well--this isn't "interpretation," it's "intuition."

As foreshadowed above, all of builds from the assumption that originalism is the way to interpret the Constitution. If this is the case, than consideration of consequences does indeed seem to go beyond the interpretive process and lead to false conclusions. But as discussed earlier, this is not the case. It isn't originalism or nothing. And it isn't originalism or "intuition." Rather, there are multiple potential approaches to choose from. And, as it turns out, judges often employ multiple approaches, both across cases and within cases, when interpreting the Constitution--a method broadly labeled as "pluralist" interpretation. Baude and Paulsen seem to avoid this underlying debate over methodology, asserting an originalist approach from the outset and proceeding from there. (see, e.g., pp. 8-9). But the possibilities of alternate methodologies should at least qualify assertions that considerations beyond original meaning are "simply wrong."

One might object to my highlighting debate over alternate theories of constitutional interpretation by arguing that the majority of Supreme Court Justices are originalists, and that it therefore makes sense to take as given that the Court will employ an originalist method in interpreting Section Three (should the issue make its way to them). Paulsen, at least, seems to express such a view in his first interview with Amar, going so far as to suggest that the Court may side 9-0 in favor of Trump's in eligibility (with the originalist justices following the article, and the three liberal justices taking an approach more in line with Ramsey's "intuitive assessment" approach). 

I'm not as convinced. The Court's approach to originalism tends to be inconsistent at best, including in recent cases that many commentators mistakenly describe as originalist decisions. I suspect that some of the more conservative justices may be at least tempted to give in to political leanings. I also suspect that these leanings may join in a coalition with institutional concerns that prompt the Court to avoid ruling that Trump is disqualified out of a fear of political backlash. All of this should give pause to assumptions that the Court will embrace interpretive principles above politics.

But say we set aside the meta-theoretical debate and accept an originalist approach to interpretation. Even then, consequences of that method still may play a role in the overall interpretive process. Considerations beyond the text frequently play a role in interpretation when the text to be interpreted is broad, undefined, or otherwise capable of multiple meanings. In choosing how to give effect to that text--say, in selecting one of multiple potential meanings, including original meanings--judges may opt for an interpretation that has better consequences or, if the case involves invalidating a law, leaving the law in place out of deference to the democratic process. 

We can make the description of the process a bit more precise by distinguishing between linguistic meaning and legal meaning. Lawrence Solum does so in distinguishing the initial step of "interpretation" (deriving the linguistic meaning of a provision) from "construction" (giving legal effect to that meaning). Perhaps Baude and Paulsen have a stronger argument that consequences don't play a role in that first step of interpretation. But even then, I'm not sure if this is right, or if it matters. The possibility remains that a theory of interpretation (that does not account for consequences) may lead to multiple meanings, including broader and narrower interpretations in the Section Three context. Sure, we may be able to narrow things down to a smaller range of potential meanings using interpretation. But the entire debate may still center around which of those meanings ought to be accepted by actors tasked with putting interpretation into effect.

And that's the debate that Baude and Paulsen have chosen to enter. For one, their argument quoted above critiques how Chase "construe[d]" Section Three--strongly suggesting they're talking about how the language is constructed. But more fundamentally, they cannot simply dismiss the process in which semantic meaning translates to legal action through government action (whether by state secretaries of states or judges). After all, they've written an article that expresses conclusions regarding what Section Three requires of modern actors, and they therefore must take all considerations into account--both at the initial stage of determining the meaning of words on a page, to the next stage of how those meanings ought to be put into effect by legal actors.

I suspect the response to this is that the original semantic meaning of Section Three is so determinate (or, "thick,") that there's no need for construction. As noted at the outset, I'm not here to argue against Baude and Paulsen on their historical points, and they've done a great deal of legwork to set forth their argument. In making this argument, I assume that Baude and Paulsen have done a thorough job of canvassing the history, amassing the argument, and providing support for their conclusions.

Even so, proving a semantic meaning that is so thick that consequentialist arguments may simply be swept beside is a tall order. Remember, construction may be required where there are multiple potential original meanings. These multiple meanings may result from the inquiry originalism requires, which involves surveying a wide range of detailed, sometimes contradictory historical accounts. It may not be certain what the original meaning was from such an investigation. Alternatively, multiple meanings may be what the interpretive inquiry turns up. A thorough examination of the historical evidence may reveal that, at the time of ratification, people held different beliefs about the meaning of Section Three. 

To be sure, one may decide to go with what appears to be the most common meaning, or to avoid meanings that only seemed to exist in certain camps (say, critics of the Fourteenth Amendment, or only people with certain expertise). But this move of selecting between alternate meanings is itself a form of construction. And the question then becomes: why allow this form of construction, while dismissing alternative forms of construction that take into account the consequences of one interpretation over another?

Baude and Paulsen must address this question as critics continue to raise concerns over the practical implications of their arguments. Thus far, their move seems to be to distinguish their interpretive arguments from consequential considerations--considerations that they claim are irrelevant to the core interpretive inquiry. The discussion above, though, suggests why this may not be the case even if Baude and Paulsen have made a strong originalist showing.

As a final note in this already lengthy post, I do not rule out the possibility of other interpretive methods reaching the same conclusion as Baude and Paulsen. McConnell raises consequentialist concerns in one direction, but the consequences of a minimal reading of Section Three in the face of such flagrant misconduct by Trump may undermine fundamental qualifications for office in the short and long term that may outweigh potential abuse of the provision. And interpretive methods beyond originalism or pragmatism may also get to the same result. I confess that my political preferences align me with Baude and Paulsen's conclusions about disqualification, as I think that Trump's conduct is reprehensible and should dissuade any reasonable voter from supporting him. But it's still worth delving into the assumptions underlying the constitutional interpretation dimension of the debate, even if doing so might cast doubt on conclusions I find agreeable.

Original Meaning, Context, and Shifting Reference Points: The Racial Connotations of "Freedmen"

At the Atlantic, Adam Serwer critiques Justice Thomas's analysis of the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause in the Court's Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College opinion. Specifically, Serwer takes issue with Thomas's claim that the term "freedmen" was racially neutral. Michael Rappaport, whose work Thomas cites in support of this claim, calls out Serwer, labeling his article as a "screed" rife with mistakes. Rappaport then argues that the term "freedmen" is race-neutral and ought to be read as referring to former slaves rather than Black people.

Below, I set out the arguments, starting with Justice Thomas, moving to Serwer, and concluding with Rappaport. I then demonstrate the flaws in Rappaport's response (and, in turn, Thomas's reasoning)--arguing that his arguments only succeed by sidestepping context necessary to determine original meaning and using shifting definitional reference points to avoid arguments about original meaning.

Setting the Stage

In SFFA v. Harvard, the Court struck down Harvard's and the University of North Carolina's affirmative action programs. In doing so, the Court concluded that the types of programs employed were inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. While the majority's treatment of the Fourteenth Amendment's history and original meaning was relatively brief, Justice Thomas authored a lengthy concurrence purporting to demonstrate the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause and why affirmative action programs are inconsistent with the clause.

In doing so, Justice Thomas defends a "colorblind" version of equal protection, drawing repeatedly on Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson. Here's one example of how Justice Thomas quotes Harlan:

For Justice Harlan, the Constitution was colorblind and categorically rejected laws designed to protect “a dominant race—a superior class of citizens,” while imposing a “badge of servitude” on others. (p. 17)

For what it's worth, here's how Justice Harlan discussed the Constitution's colorblindness:

The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.

To very quickly summarize: the colorblind approach to equal protection is important to Justice Thomas (and the majority) because they read the Equal Protection Clause as a blanket ban on any racial distinctions in law. This applies not only to laws that disadvantage or denigrate people on the basis of race, but also laws that are designed to provide benefits to people on the basis of race. A strict, colorblind reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of "the equal protection of the laws," therefore prohibits affirmative action programs, which increase the probability of admission for certain applicants on the basis of race.

In arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment's original meaning supports such a reading, one obstacle Thomas confronts is that of laws providing particular benefits and protections to "freedmen," or former slaves, enacted around the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's enactment and ratification. The argument with which Thomas contends is that laws like the 1865 and 1866 Freedmen's Bureau Acts provided benefits to freedmen, and therefore provided benefits on the basis of race. This undermines an originalist reading that the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to be neutral above all else by demonstrating that the same Congress that voted for the Fourteenth Amendment also enacted laws containing racial classifications.

Thomas rejects this reading of the Freedmen's Bureau Acts:

Importantly, however, the Acts applied to freedmen (and refugees), a formally race-neutral category, not blacks writ large. And, because “not all blacks in the United States were former slaves,” “ ‘freedman’ ” was a decidedly underinclusive proxy for race. M. Rappaport, Originalism and the Colorblind Constitution, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 71, 98 (2013) (Rappaport). Moreover, the Freedmen’s Bureau served newly freed slaves alongside white refugees. P. Moreno, Racial Classifications and Reconstruction Legislation, 61 J. So. Hist. 271, 276–277 (1995); R. Barnett & E. Bernick, The Original Meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment 119 (2021). And, advocates of the law explicitly disclaimed any view rooted in modern conceptions of antisubordination. To the contrary, they explicitly clarified that the equality sought by the law was not one in which all men shall be “six feet high”; rather, it strove to ensure that freedmen enjoy “equal rights before the law” such that “each man shall have the right to pursue in his own way life, liberty, and happiness.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 322, 342.

In his Atlantic article, Serwer rejects this argument:

“Freedmen” cannot be a “formally race-neutral category,” because American slavery was not a formally race-neutral institution. Moreover, an extensive historical record illuminates the intentions of the lawmakers who passed the Freedmen’s Bureau Acts. They certainly did not see the term freedmen as racially neutral, and they intended the bureau to protect the rights of Black people in the South, whether formerly enslaved or not. We know this because they said so; the insistence to the contrary is the result of conservatives projecting their version of “color blindness” backwards through time.

Serwer goes on to argue that ninety percent of Black people were slaves in 1860, citing an email exchange with historian Eric Foner. He also points to evidence that supporters of the Freedmen's Bureau Acts, those who debated them, and Justice Thomas himself use the terms "freedmen" and "blacks" independently. These arguments align with points made by Justice Sotomayor in her dissent (pp. 6-8) where she also notes that "contemporaries understood that the Freedmen's Bureau Act benefited Black people" and that the same congress that passed the Act also passed the Fourteenth Amendment.

At The Originalism Blog, Mike Rappaport takes issue with Serwer, arguing that Serwer manages to "include both the main mistakes historians make about the Freedmen’s Bureau Acts and some of the principal slanders against modern originalism." Rappaport also chides Serwer for failing to read his law review article, "Originalism and the Colorblind Constitution," which Thomas cites in his concurrence (a citation included in the quoted excerpt of Thomas's concurrence).

Rappaport argues that Serwer fails to defeat the originalist case for a race-neutral reading of the Equal Protection Clause, focusing on evidence regarding the Freedmen's Bureau Acts:

If Serwer wants to prove his point, he needs to claim that freedmen meant blacks rather than former slaves. But that is pretty difficult, given that the term “freedmen” pretty clearly indicates someone who used to be a slave and has now been freed. Serwer quotes a couple of historians to claim otherwise but their arguments miss the point. For example, Serwer quotes an Eric Foner email stating “Ninety percent of Blacks were slaves in 1860, and everyone knew whom the Freedom Bureau Act was meant to assist.” But that is not the question. The question is whether "freedmen" referred to people based on their color or based on circumstances.

Serwer’s principal argument is that all freedmen were black. True enough, but irrelevant. The question is whether "freedmen" was a category that selected people based on race. It does not. Not all blacks were freedmen. Some had been born free. (And there were no whites, who were former slaves, who were not treated as freedmen.) The Act identifies a category based on circumstances, not race. 

Is the Original Meaning of "Freedmen" Race-Neutral?

With this extensive stage-setting finally done, it's worth taking a step back to look at what it is Thomas and Rappaport are trying to prove. Both zero in on the textual meaning of "freedmen" to advance their points. But it's worth keeping in mind that the meaning of "freedmen" is secondary--the ultimate goal here is how the term "freedmen" informs the meaning of "equal protection of the laws" in the Fourteenth Amendment.

How does this argument function? Those like Serwer and Sotomayor contend that if "freedmen" is not racially-neutral, then laws that explicitly benefit freedmen are therefore laws that provide a benefit based on race. The Freedmen's Bureau Act doesn't involve the exact same terminology of "Equal Protection," but the implication is that if it is not racially neutral, then it provides context for understanding the meaning of other language approved of by the same enacting body. In short, a strict, race-neutral reading of equal protection doesn't make sense if enacted by a Congress that also enacted race-based benefit schemes.

Rappaport and Thomas zoom in on terms and technical definitions to advance their race-neutral reading. Rappaport's point in his blog is a good distilled version of the arguments he makes in his article, and Thomas's reasoning is an even briefer version of the points. "Freedmen" isn't a racial term because not all Black people were slaves (Rappaport does acknowledge in his article that 89 percent of Black people at the time of the Civil War were slaves, and that, of the remaining 11 percent, "some, of course, were former slaves") (p. 98 n.108).

Through this exchange, it's important to track what reference points the parties are employing in defining the term, "freedmen." Serwer and Sotomayor appear to be arguing from an original intent (and, potentially, a limited original public meaning) approach. The meaning of "freedmen," at least as understood among those debating and enacting the Fourteenth Amendment and Freedmen's Bureau Acts, was not race-neutral. Accordingly, a law providing benefits based on freedmen status is a race-based classification. Rappaport purports to respond to this argument, but does so by employing a different reference point: the dictionary definition of "freedmen" as "formerly enslaved person"--a definition which, in turn, does not apply to all Black people (as a small percentage of Black people had not been enslaved). Rappaport seizes on this definitional to argue that the term is therefore race-neutral. But this is unconvincing. 

First, this argument requires one to look past the sheer proportion of Black people who fit into the "freedman" category and the fact that all people in the "freedmen" category were Black. All of this provides valuable context for what those using "freedmen" at the time of the enactment of the Freedmen's Bureau Acts and the Fourteenth Amendment meant: that "freedmen" was a racialized term used to refer to Black people. This is the point Serwer makes when he notes that those in the 39th Congress, and Justice Thomas himself, use "freedmen" interchangeably with "Blacks" and "negroes."

And context is important when determining original meaning. After all, this entire debate over the meaning of "freedmen" is taking place because the meaning of the Freedmen's Bureau Acts provides contextual evidence for or against a race-neutral reading of "equal protection" in the Fourteenth Amendment. It therefore seems quite strange to admit contextual evidence like the Freedmen's Bureau Acts to determine the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, while overlooking contextual evidence of the racial makeup freedmen and the low percentage of Black non-freedmen when attempting to sort out the original meaning of "freedmen."

Second, by changing his reference point, Rappaport does not engage with what Serwer and Sotomayor are discussing: the original understanding of the "freedmen" by those in Congress (and potentially the public). In the context of this debate, and most originalist analysis, it is this type of definition--not strained dictionary manipulation--that is characteristic of the original meaning that ought to be employed in the final analysis. Serwer and Sotomayor argue on this level. Rappaport (and for the most part Thomas) do not.

As a result, Rappaport's response fails to engage with Serwer's argument, which relies on context and the understanding of those enacting the Freedmen's Bureau Acts and the Fourteenth Amendment--context and understanding that, despite "freedmen's" dictionary definition of "freed slave," imbues the term with racial meaning. Instead, Rappaport's response falls back on dictionary definitions and notions of inclusiveness, technical points that he fails to connect with the understanding of those in Congress or the general public at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted.

Rappaport suggests that Serwer failed to consult his law review article, so let's not make that mistake. In his article, it looks like Rappaport comes closer to addressing Serwer's point:

Second, while as a formal matter freedmen is not a racial term, it obviously has a strong connection and overlap with race. Thus, even if one does not treat the term as racial, one would still want to closely examine whether the term was being secretly used for racial purposes. There is, however, no reason to believe that the term freedmen was being used in this manner. There is an obvious reason why the Congress might have passed these Acts that has nothing to do with the race of the former slaves. These slaves had been oppressed in the most extensive way and had not received a basic education or learned the trade skills necessary to live self-sufficiently. Moreover, not only did they lack human capital, they also had acquired no physical capital in the form of land or money. Thus, it made perfect sense to provide them with education, food, shelter, and land in order to allow people who had been uniquely oppressed to enter society as free individuals. Further, even if one did not believe that these goods and services were needed to allow the former slaves to live self-sufficiently, one might argue that the benefits could be justified as a limited form of compensation for the harms these slaves had suffered.

Here, however, Rappaport still fails to engage with original meaning and context. Rappaport's initial recognition of the "strong connection and overlap with race" that the term "freedmen" quickly devolves into an inquiry over whether the term was being "secretly used for racial purposes." At this point, Rappaport has already left the debate. Assuming secrecy and subterfuge also assumes that the term, "freedmen" wasn't generally understood to have racial connotations--the point that Rappaport is supposed to be disproving. There is no secret, as using the term "freedmen" in a law is evidence enough that one is making a race-based classification.

From here, Rappaport's line of argument continues afield. He argues that there were reasons other than race to use the term "freedman." These former slaves hadn't received a basic education, they lacked human capital, they had no money or shelter. It's because of these conditions of slavery--not race, that they deserve special treatment.

This line of argumentation misses the point for two reasons. First, Rappaport's resort to the reasons for why Congress passed acts targeting freedmen fail to delve into why freedmen were enslaved and therefore lacked land, money, education, and other resources. They were enslaved because of their race. Accordingly, these alternative reasons remain inextricably connected with race. 

Second, as flagged above, the notion that there's a "secret" effort to target race begs the question by assuming that "freedmen" is not a racial term. But as Serwer argues, and as Rappaport appears to acknowledge at the beginning of this paragraph, "freedmen" is a racial term. In context--in a nation where slavery had just ended, where all the slaves were Black, and where the vast majority of Black people were former slaves--the term "freedmen" has racial connotations. The definitional parsing and claims of underinclusiveness do not engage with this contextual point. As with the previous line of argumentation, the resort to underinclusiveness claims is an unexplained and unwarranted abandonment of the relevant context and fails to refer back to original meaning.

The overall goal of this post was to lay out why it is that Rappaport's arguments appear unconvincing. His point may seem off at the outset, but without parsing out the different reference points involved in the debate and Rappaport's shift to dictionary definitions while purporting to describe original understanding, it may not be clear why precisely Rappaport's arguments fail to land.

The Implications of "Refugees"

This post is already too long, so why not make it just a bit longer? Both Thomas and Rappaport (in his article, at least) argue that the Freedmen's Bureau Acts also provided benefits for "refugees"--a term that both Rappaport and Thomas suggest mainly referred to white people. Thomas's argument on this point is short and fails to explain the significance of the point: "Moreover, the Freedmen's Bureau served newly freed slaves alongside white refugees." Rappaport's argument is more detailed:

Third, the bulk of the provisions under the Freedmen's Bureau Acts provided benefits to both freedmen and refugees. The term refugees would normally include whites, and once it is recognized that virtually all southern blacks would be freedmen, refugees becomes a term that would appear to have been intended mainly to cover whites. If one were concerned that the use of freedmen was an attempt to provide benefits on racial grounds, then the inclusion of refugees should help to quiet that concern. One question that one must ask about a category that overlaps with race is whether that nonracial category is being used as a subterfuge to benefit or harm a race. If the Acts merely provided benefits to freedmen, even though non-blacks were similarly in need of the same benefits, then one might be suspicious of the omission. By contrast, if the benefit is extended to non-blacks in a similar position, there is far less concern of it being a secretive attempt to provide racial benefits. I am skeptical that refugees really were similarly situated to former slaves, but if one did think so, this would quiet that concern. Moreover, there is evidence in the legislative history that refugees were added in part because of concerns that the proposed legislation was seen by some as race-based.

While Rappaport's treatment of refugee benefits is longer than Thomas's, it's still unclear how this proves the point that benefits provided to freedmen weren't benefits provided on racial grounds. Rappaport appears to acknowledge that this point has no bearing on the racial connotations of "freedmen," now acknowledging that all freedmen are Black and suggesting that benefit provision to refugees therefore applies mainly to white people. At the same time, Rappaport continues to argue as though providing benefits to Black people is being attempted via subterfuge--a tactic that (as noted above) assumes the conclusion that "freedmen" was originally understood to be race-neutral. The most apparent issue is that even if "refugee" is a race-neutral term, it's unclear how what bearing its neutrality has on the separate term, "freedmen."

It appears that Rappaport is arguing that the Freedmen Bureau's Act, by providing benefits to refugees, balances out the allocation of benefits "to non-blacks in a similar position" and therefore balances out the provision of benefits to white people and Black people. His final sentence supports this reading, where he notes that there's evidence that "refugees were added in part because of concerns that the proposed legislation was seen by some as race-based."

But if this is the point Rappaport is making, it only succeeds if one assumes the opposite of what Rappaport is attempting to prove, that providing benefits to "freedmen" is the provision of benefits on the basis of race. If including refugees as a separate category of beneficiaries is necessary to accomplish racial neutrality, then any benefit specifically provided to freedmen is a benefit provided on the basis of race. Indeed, from a racial classification perspective, this seems to be even more problematic for Rappaport's colorblind vision, as this reading characterizes the Act as counteracting one racial classification with a second, separate racial classification. 

Problems arise further to the extent that benefits were allocated differently between refugees and freedmen. Eric Schnapper details this differentiated treatment, highlighting "four race-conscious provisions" in the Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1866, including a different scope of overall aid to be provided to freedmen as opposed to refugees, a limitation of the use of land and buildings for education to freedmen only, and certain land protections for freedmen only." (p. 772-73). 

Ultimately, this point is secondary, and gets fairly short shrift in Thomas's opinion. But it's worth mentioning to the extent that it further demonstrates Rappaport's shifting and lack of clarity regarding definitional reference points.

There is much more to discuss regarding the Court's opinion, Thomas's concurrence, and even the original meaning of freedmen. But this post is now far longer than reason demands, and I will leave it to the reader to seek out commentary on those other points elsewhere. I'm sure, as the weeks and months go on, much more will be said.

Choosing History

Will Baude has written a column in the Washington Post, entitled Of Course the Supreme Court Needs to Use History. The Question is How.

Baude discusses the Supreme Court's use of history in its most recent term. He argues that using history is unavoidable:

History is inextricably connected to law. Our Constitution and statutes were enacted in the past, and amended in the past, and so understanding their content is an inherently historical endeavor. History, practiced properly, also can supply objectivity, giving the justices a basis for deciding beyond their personal views and the controversies of the day.

This use of history, as Baude notes, led to some recent dramatic decisions. In Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, the Court ruled that there was no constitutional right to abortion, overturning Roe v. Wade, and causing abortion becoming illegal in numerous states due to trigger laws. In New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, the Court overturned a New York statutory scheme that had been in place for more than a century that required people to prove good cause in order to obtain a license to carry concealed firearms.

In Bruen, the Court first held (after about a page of analysis with no historical discussion) that the Second Amendment protected a right to carry firearms in public--extending the scope of the Second Amendment's protection beyond the scope of the home. The Court then spent most of its opinion applying a "historical tradition" approach to the constitutional interpretation. In Bruen, this meant that the government could restrict the Second Amendment right to carry firearms only if it could show a historical tradition of analogous restrictions on the right to carry firearms in public. The Court considered a host of laws, cases, and commentary, ranging from English law and common law, to colonial-era restrictions, to laws at the founding, during reconstruction, and beyond. Laws that happened to support broad restrictions were outliers, the Court argued. Old English authorities, like the Statute of Northampton, were outdated. Many of the founding-era and reconstruction-era restrictions were too narrow to be analogous--they restricted carrying firearms for certain purposes only, like causing terror and disruption. By choosing what historical laws were analogous, the Court was able to shape the historic record to fit its desired outcome: that there was no tradition of restricting the carrying of firearms. New York's law therefore had to go.

The next day, in Dobbs, the Court engaged in similar analysis to determine whether there was a historical tradition of permitting abortion. No such tradition existed, the Court claimed, citing "English cases dating all the way back to the 13th century" (despite its earlier discrediting of the Statute of Northampton as too old) and citing a host of historic restrictions banning pre-quickening abortion (that is, abortion before movement of the fetus could be detected--often at a point between the 16th and 18th week of pregnancy). These pre-quickening restrictions--restrictions that prohibited abortion in certain circumstances--are similar to many of the historic restrictions on carrying firearms that the Court rejected in Bruen--gun restrictions only banned carrying firearms in certain circumstances. In Dobbs, however, the Court cited these cases to support its conclusion that there was no historic recognition of any right to an abortion. The Court argued that just because pre-quickening abortion "was not itself considered homicide, it does not follow that abortion was permissible at common law--much less that abortion was a legal right." (Dobbs, p. 2250). Using this logic (logic that was notably absent in Bruen) The Dobbs Court cited partial abortion restrictions as evidence of a lack of a historical tradition of recognizing abortion rights. 

This closer look at these opinions reveals that the Court is not so much "doing" or "using" history as Baude suggests, but "choosing" history. Looking up historical evidence and parsing out historic laws and their development is a small, and seemingly insignificant part of the Court's analysis. The real work happens when the Court decides whether evidence is analogous to a present claimed right or restriction. 

The Court provides virtually no guidance or rules for this process. The Court doesn't say how many historical laws and regulations are necessary to establish a tradition, how old examples can get before they are too old, or where to draw the line between founding- or reconstruction-era laws that clarify or liquify meaning versus those that are unacceptably modern. This failure to provide guidance isn't an accident. It gives the Court the flexibility to treat the evidence in a manner that supports its desired conclusion. For example, in Dobbs, the Court cited commentaries from as far back as the 13th century as evidence of historic abortion restrictions. But the day before, in Bruen, it dismissed the Statute of Northampton (enacted in 1328 and in place for hundreds of years thereafter) as inapplicable, in part because they were unacceptably ancient. 

Another example: in Bruen, the Court dismissed colonial-era examples of restrictions on carrying firearms, stating that the respondents had only identified three such regulations and that "we doubt that three colonial regulations could suffice to show a tradition of public-carry regulation." (Bruen at 2143). Earlier in its opinion, though, the Court asserted that restricting firearms in "sensitive places" was consistent with historical tradition--despite citing sources that were only able to identify two examples of colonial and founding-era restrictions on carrying firearms in sensitive places. (Dobbs at 2133, citing an article by Kopel & Greenlee and an amicus brief that only identify Maryland laws forbidding carrying guns in the houses of the legislature and a Delaware constitutional provision prohibiting guns in polling places). When it comes to restricting firearms, three examples are not enough to establish a historical tradition. But when it comes to reaffirming the sensitive places analysis that Justice Thomas had previously signed onto when he joined the Court's opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller, two examples were sufficient.

Baude argues that if critics of the Court want to make a difference, they're going to "have to make the best use of history, not try to escape it." They can't be like the dissenting Justices who "engaged superficially on historical grounds." This strategy is misguided. Confronting the Court with historical evidence likely make a difference in politically salient cases--as Bruen and Dobbs demonstrate. Critics may do history, they may use history. They may set forth a slew of examples in support of their claims. But this won't make any difference to a Court that chooses history to support desired results.

Choosing history as a basis for constitutional interpretation also skews the playing field against progress and protection of disadvantaged groups. The dissenting Justices make this point in Dobbs: 

We referred there to the “people” who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment: What rights did those “people” have in their heads at the time? But, of course, “people” did not ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. Men did. So it is perhaps not so surprising that the ratifiers were not perfectly attuned to the importance of reproductive rights for women's liberty, or for their capacity to participate as equal members of our Nation. Indeed, the ratifiers—both in 1868 and when the original Constitution was approved in 1788—did not understand women as full members of the community embraced by the phrase “We the People.” In 1868, the first wave of American feminists were explicitly told—of course by men—that it was not their time to seek constitutional protections. (Women would not get even the vote for another half-century.) To be sure, most women in 1868 also had a foreshortened view of their rights: If most men could not then imagine giving women control over their bodies, most women could not imagine having that kind of autonomy. But that takes away nothing from the core point. Those responsible for the original Constitution, including the Fourteenth Amendment, did not perceive women as equals, and did not recognize women's rights. When the majority says that we must read our foundational charter as viewed at the time of ratification (except that we may also check it against the Dark Ages), it consigns women to second-class citizenship. (Dobbs at 2324-25, Breyer J. dissenting).

What does Baude have to say to the fact that history itself is skewed due to the historic mistreatment and disenfranchisement of women and African-Americans?

The use of constitutional history has been challenged as inherently regressive. Why should today’s public policy decisions owe anything to past eras when women or people of color were excluded from power? This argument misses the point. In cases like Dobbs, the court seeks to free government from constitutional constraint, arguing that today’s governing majorities are entitled to make their own choices about abortion policy, no matter what dead White men in wigs may have thought. In cases like Bruen, the court relies on historical arguments that the right to keep and bear arms was especially vital to newly freed African Americans in the wake of the Civil War. And in other cases, the court has used history to vindicate the rights of criminal defendants and other unpopular groups.

Baude's point about Dobbs is unresponsive. As the Dissent points out, the absence of women's voices and participation in the political process is a glaring example of how history is skewed in a particular direction--here against the interests of women. For hundreds of years, women weren't guaranteed the right to vote. They were restricted from many professions, including the law and and the teaching of law. Is it really all that surprising that the notion that the right to abortion had anything to do with the right to privacy was a relatively recent part of legal discussions over abortion law? What's more, Dobbs wasn't about the meaning of the Constitution's text. The Court's conclusion regarding the scope of Due Process was based entirely on historical laws and restrictions, filtered through the selective reliance on certain examples and characterizing other examples in a manner that rendered them irrelevant or transformed them into further support. 

Additionally, Baude's mention of historical arguments about the relevance of the right to bear arms for newly freed African Americans in Bruen rings hollow in light of the fact that substantial majorities of modern communities of color support stricter gun laws (a point that Adam Winkler raises here). Baude's argument demonstrates the point he's trying to refute. In citing the reconstruction-era need for African Americans to be armed, the Court applies the oppression that African Americans faced during reconstruction to modern circumstances. This historic violence, which was perpetuated by white communities and government officials, ends up shaping and defining the modern right to keep and bear arms for all communities, despite the opposition of modern communities of color.

Perhaps there will be occasional exceptions where historical tradition aligns with the rights of criminal defendants an unpopular groups. But historical discrimination and oppression of women, racial minorities, Native Americans, and other disadvantaged communities suggests that we are off to a rough start if we choose to look to the past to guide present decisions. Cloaking the analysis in with phrases like "original public meaning" or "historical tradition," and characterizing the analysis as "ultimately deciding . . . law, not history for its own sake" as Baude urges may obscure this reality and make the process seem more neutral. But "doing" or "using" history leaves those seeking meaningful reforms and protections for disadvantaged groups and communities at a disadvantage from the outset. 

A clarification: Parties and those arguing before the Court should, of course, do what they can to make historical arguments. Doing so will ensure that no stone is left unturned and will shine a brighter spotlight on the Court's motivated reasoning.

Criticizing the Court's methodology is preferable to attempting to meet the Court on a skewed playing field. Perhaps the Court won't listen. But making this point abundantly clear to voters and lawmakers may prompt reforms or--at the very least--urge the election of Presidents and Senators who will appoint and approve Justices who engage in alternate methodology. Critics are better off making these arguments than legitimizing flawed, skewed, malleable historical and originalist methodologies by participating in those methods themselves.

UPDATE

Those who want to read even more about this should check out my draft article on the Court's historical tradition approach in Bruen, which I just posted to SSRN. Comments are welcome!

Originalism and Selective Historic Reference Points

A little over a week ago, Michael Dorf wrote an article in Verdict regarding oral arguments in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. Bruen. This is the Supreme Court's most significant Second Amendment case since McDonald v. City of Chicago, in which the Court incorporated the Second Amendment, holding that it applies against state restrictions on the right to keep and bear arms. The Supreme Court's prior opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller, two years before, had only held that the Second Amendment applied to federal restrictions. 

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, like McDonald, involves a non-federal restriction on firearms. Most rights included in the Bill of Rights have been incorporated to apply against state and local governments--with the Supreme Court basing this incorporation in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Justice Thomas has previously argued for an alternate approach to incorporation, arguing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the basis to apply the Second Amendment (and other rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights) against the states.

Dorf focuses on a question that Justice Thomas asked during oral argument:

Attorney Paul Clement argued the case for the plaintiffs. He contended that “history and tradition” supported his position. Justice Thomas, who, more than any of his colleagues, espouses originalism, understood Clement’s invocation of history to imply that the Court should look at what the constitutional text meant to the People who ratified it. But that then raised a question. Justice Thomas asked: “should we look at the founding, or should we look at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, which then, of course, applies it to the states?”

Clement, a former Solicitor General of the United States, is an excellent lawyer, so he gave the answer that best served his clients: it doesn’t matter. Whether you look at the original public meaning in 1791, when the Second Amendment was ratified, or at the original public meaning in 1868, you will find the same answer: a right of generally law-abiding citizens to carry firearms in public.

Is that right? As I discussed in an article published in the Northwestern University Law Review earlier this year, there is reason to believe (and sources cited in footnote 37 of my article conclude) that the People who ratified the Second Amendment understood its language to prevent the federal government from disarming state militias but not to have many implications for individual firearms possession, while the People who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 understood at least some kind of individual right to keep and bear arms to be among the privileges and immunities that the provision secured against state interference. (emphasis added).

Dorf notes that the Court, both historically and now, has refused to find that constitutional amendments incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment offer differing limits on the power of state governments compared to the federal government:

Most of the cases incorporating provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states arose during the 1960s. During that era, the Justices debated whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates Bill of Rights provisions against the states in exactly the way they apply to the federal government—a position sometimes called “jot-for-jot” incorporation—or whether in some instances the incorporated right might have different implications for the states.

We have already encountered one reason why a right might be different as applied to the federal government and the states: perhaps by the time the People ratified the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, their understanding of the right had changed from the views that prevailed when the original Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791. Federalism provides another explanation: within broad bounds, each of the fifty states might be permitted some leeway in light of distinctive traditions and variations in their legal systems.

Despite the appeal of history and federalism, the Court eventually settled on jot-for-jot incorporation. Indeed, just last year, in Ramos v. Louisiana, Justice Neil Gorsuch, writing for the majority, decisively “rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In Ramos, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s incorporation of the Sixth Amendment’s right to jury trial in criminal cases precludes conviction based on a non-unanimous jury decision in state court, just as in federal court.

Dorf notes that Thomas, as well as other justices who've authored or signed opinions regarding the scope of incorporated amendments (including Justice Gorsuch in Ramos) claim to be originalists. I've written about originalism before, both here and in longer work. Most modern versions of originalism hold that the meaning of the Constitution and its amendments are fixed at the time of ratification, and that the original public meaning of those provisions at the time of enactment is the same meaning that should be applied today. That notion of fixed meaning (sometimes described as the "fixation thesis") is accepted by most modern academic originalists.

But if meaning is fixed at the time of ratification, then most of the amendments in the Bill of Rights likely apply differently against state and local law than they do against federal laws. That's because these amendments don't apply directly to state laws. Instead, they apply to states via the Fourteenth Amendment, which was ratified 1868--many years after the amendments were originally enacted at the end of the 1700s. During those years, the public's understanding of the often broad, abstract, and value-charged language of these amendments likely changed to some degree. And yet, self-proclaimed originalists on the Court pay little mind to this--indeed some have explicitly rejected it. Take McDonald, the case that incorporated the Second Amendment against the states. There, Justice Scalia--recognized as the highest profile originalist to sit on the court--joined in the portion of Justice Alito's opinion that explicitly rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment may provide a different level of protection to the right to bear arms:

[Justice Stevens] would hold that "[t]he rights protected against state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause need not be identical in shape or scope to the rights protected against Federal Government infringement by the various provisions of the Bill of Rights." Post, at 3093.

As we have explained, the Court, for the past half century, has moved away from the two-track approach. If we were now to accept Justice STEVENS' theory across the board, decades of decisions would be undermined. We assume that this is not what is proposed. What is urged instead, it appears, is that this theory be revived solely for the individual right that Heller recognized, over vigorous dissents.

Justice Thomas, it should be noted, did not join in this portion of the opinion.

Alito's view is hardly without historic support. The Court has long refused to recognize differing levels of protection by the Fourteenth Amendment, warning against a potential dilution of protection against state law enforcement compared with federal law enforcement and raising the specter of incongruous enforcement of constitutional rights against different government actors. Take Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Malloy v. Hogan:

The Court thus has rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a "watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights," Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U. S. 263, 275 (dissenting opinion). If Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U. S. 117, and Adamson v. California, supra, suggest such an application of the privilege against self-incrimination, that suggestion cannot survive recognition of the degree to which the Twining view of the privilege has been eroded. What is accorded is a privilege of refusing to incriminate one's self, and the feared prosecution may be by either federal or state authorities. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, post, p. 52. It would be incongruous to have different standards determine the validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared prosecution, depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or federal court. Therefore, the same standards must determine whether an accused's silence in either a federal or state proceeding is justified. (emphasis added).

Incongruous as such a legal regime would be, it would at least be an originalist one. Refusing to apply two different standards rejects the fixation thesis in favor of the broader goal of a consistent set of rules governing the scope of constitutional amendments. This goal may be sensible, but it isn't consistent with originalism. And this ignorance of basic originalist principles may not always be in the service of such noble goals, as Dorf argues:

To be sure, in Ramos, as in McDonald, Justice Thomas concurred separately to insist that the Privileges or Immunities Clause, rather than the Due Process Clause, does the work of incorporation. But for him as well as his colleagues, originalism—which allows for changed meanings between 1791 and 1868—stood as no obstacle to full incorporation, which they favored on what pretty clearly appeared to be policy grounds.

In that respect, the irrelevance of Justice Thomas’s question—1791 or 1868?—jibes with everything else we know about originalism. In the most hotly contested cases that come before the Supreme Court, arguments rooted in original meaning typically serve a rhetorical function. Justices invoke them to justify decisions taken on other, ideological, grounds.

What are the implications of all of this? 

First, it suggests that as much as originalist scholars may argue in favor of originalism, these arguments seem to have little impact on the Court's actual practice, which consistently ignores (and is based in a history of ignoring) the notion that constitutional provisions' meanings are fixed at the time of enactment. Originalists may respond that failures to appropriately apply originalism should not count against the theory itself. Indeed, some argue that the recognition of such failures by the professoriate turns out to be a point in favor of originalism. Leaving a thorough response to that peculiar defense for another day, I will note for now that if the Court continues to consistently misapply originalism (and reach decisions based on the foundation of jot-for-jot case law), there ought to come a point where originalists should ask themselves whether everything they are working for is really worth it. 

Second, the longstanding failure of the Court to recognize that the meaning of constitutional provisions are fixed at the time of reenactment in the Fourteenth Amendment context threatens a recent trend in originalist scholarship arguing for a positivist take on the theory. This "positivist turn" in originalist theory (very broadly and briefly summarized), argues that originalism is our law, and that it should be followed because judges promise to follow the law. If the Court's history of failing to apply the original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment forms the basis for a great deal of constitutional law, the thesis that originalism is, in fact, our law is significantly undermined.

Third, the issue of whether to interpret early Amendments based on their meaning at the time of the founding or at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification represents a subsection of a debate over when the Constitution's meaning should be fixed. For the most part, this debate is sadly limited--originalists argue for fixation at the time of ratification, a few people (and I) argue that provisions should be read based on present public meaning, and the Court apparently favors fixation at the time of the founding, 1868 be damned. But there are more options. Why should we consider the meaning of the Constitution as fixed at any point before the Fifteenth Amendment barred the United States and the states from denying the right to vote based on race in 1870? Why shouldn't the meaning of the Constitution be fixed in 1920 when the 19th Amendment's ratification guaranteed women the right to vote? Some may argue that the Constitution has mechanisms for amendments built in, and that this "potential sovereignty" somehow ameliorates the failure of earlier iterations of the Constitution to accommodate the democratic input of those it governs and protects. But this doesn't account for the fact that determinations of original public meaning tend to focus on the voices of those who played a role in the drafting, adoption, and ratification of constitutional provisions, and that the voices of women and African Americans were absent from these contexts for centuries. Those historically excluded from voting may not want to completely do away with the Constitution and amendments as they're worded, but they ought to have some sort of a say in the meaning of these provisions if we're going to claim with a straight face that the Constitution represents the popular will of a supermajority of Americans.

While I have dozens of depositions and hundreds of other projects and emergencies to worry about over the next few months, I'm sure I'll find the time to write more on these issues. In the meantime, we'll see if any of the Justices make an effort to differentiate between or justify particular historic reference points for their constitutional interpretations when the opinion in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association is eventually issued.