Section Three, Originalism, and Interpretive Alternatives

William Baude and Michael Stokes Paulsen have written a recent article, "The Sweep and Force of Section Three," in which they argue that Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment is a self-executing provision that renders Donald Trump ineligible for the presidency as a result of his role in attempting to overthrow the results of the 2020 election.

The article has been the talk of both legal academia and the wider public in recent weeks, drawing a great deal of attention and drawing support and criticism from various scholars and commentators. While this post adds to the commentary, let me emphasize at the outset that I do not dig into the weeds of the historical claims or evidence that Baude and Paulsen amass. Indeed, this post isn't so much a response to the article, but instead derives primarily from how Baude and Paulsen have described and defended their claims in follow-up discussions (particularly in recent episodes of "Amarica's Constitution," which Baude highlights here), and have only reviewed portions of the article that get into the interpretive issues I focus on here.

This was initially meant to be a response to a brief comment Michael Ramsey's post at The Originalism Blog, which highlighted some recent coverage of Baude and Paulsen's article. Ramsey closes his post with this comment:

There's a lot of originalism in these debates and in commentary on the Section 3 issues generally. It's worth noting that the nonoriginalist alternative is that judges decide whether Trump should be disqualified based on their intuitive assessment of what's best in light of modern needs and circumstances.

This characterization of the options for interpreting Section Three is an oversimplification. And it's an oversimplification worth highlighting because of its frequent occurrence in debates between originalists and nonoriginalists--including in Baude and Paulsen's defense of their claims against certain critiques.

Contrary to Ramsey's claim, there are a number of nonoriginalist means by which one may interpret Section Three before resorting to mere intuitive assessments. A judge might interpret the text by reference to its present meaning and understanding, as well as how it fits in with the structure of the Fourteenth Amendment and the rest of the Constitution, without looking to the historical debates over the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning and place in the Constitution. Alternatively, a judge may look to how Section Three has been interpreted in subsequent cases and rely on meaning developed over time through common law reasoning to determine how that language should be applied in a present case. And while "intuitive assessment" of modern needs suggests little more than going with one's gut, or shooting from the hip based on initial impressions, considerations of modern needs and circumstances--albeit through thorough consideration of consequences and careful reasoning--may also play a role, as those espousing pragmatist theories of interpretation argue at length.

And even the method that Ramsey highlights is one worth noting. As concerning as "intuitive assessment" might sound, considering modern needs and circumstances probably ought to play at least some role in the decisionmaking process--even if those considerations factor in on a level beyond interpretation. Even if there's a strong originalist argument in favor of disqualification, one shouldn't lose sight of the broader context. Indeed, another originalist, Michael McConnell, urges a narrow reading of Section Three out of concern for the consequences of a broad reading:

Putting together my friends' broad definitions of "insurrection" and "engage," and lack of concern about enforcement procedure, I worry that this approach could empower partisans to seek disqualification every time a politician supports or speaks in support of the objectives of a political riot. Imagine how bad actors will use this theory. If that is what Section 3 necessarily means, we have to live with it. But in my opinion, we should seek the narrowest, most precise, least susceptible to abuse, definition that is consistent with history and precedent. In the absence of actual engagement in actual insurrection, judged as such by competent authorities, we should allow the American people to vote for the candidates of their choice.

Baude and Paulsen respond by arguing that this is an inappropriate way to interpret the Constitution (both in the initial link and in this second episode as well). They argue that concerns over misapplication of a particular interpretation do not invalidate the criticized interpretation, and analogize McConnell's concerns over consequences to a judge's first selecting a preferred result and then structuring an interpretive method that ensures the result. Instead, they argue, one should engage in principled interpretation to figure out what the Constitution truly means, and follow that meaning from there, even if it might lead to unexpected or undesirable consequences.

Baude and Paulsen take this position in their article as well. Here's an example of this point from their article, in which they critique Chief Justice (or, in this case, Circuit Justice) Chase's opinion in In re Griffin:

Chase’s construe-to-avoid-the-force-of-constitutional-language-whose-policy-consequences-you-dislike approach to constitutional interpretation is simply wrong. Judges do not get to rewrite constitutional provisions they find objectionable on policy grounds. Relatedly, judges do not get to make up new provisions of law in order to devise policy “solutions” to texts they don’t like. Chase’s opinion imposed, as a solution to textual literalism and its real and imagined policy inconveniences, a different kind of constitutional provision, one more like the Impeachment Clause and the Treason Clause. Put bluntly, Chase made up law that was not there in order to change law that was there but that he did not like. (p. 40)

As Baude and Paulsen advance this argument--both in the excerpt above, and in responding to McConnell's critique--they tend to treat concern over consequences as something distinct from a theory of interpretation. This, at least, is the impression I get when they claim to be following the Constitution's meaning wherever it will lead, rather than letting consequences dictate how the Constitution ought to be given effect. In particular, they argue that originalist interpretation--looking to the original public meaning of the Constitution--is the way to go, and pragmatic considerations are something other than interpretation entirely. Ramsey's characterization of "intuitive assessments" of modern needs suggests this as well--this isn't "interpretation," it's "intuition."

As foreshadowed above, all of builds from the assumption that originalism is the way to interpret the Constitution. If this is the case, than consideration of consequences does indeed seem to go beyond the interpretive process and lead to false conclusions. But as discussed earlier, this is not the case. It isn't originalism or nothing. And it isn't originalism or "intuition." Rather, there are multiple potential approaches to choose from. And, as it turns out, judges often employ multiple approaches, both across cases and within cases, when interpreting the Constitution--a method broadly labeled as "pluralist" interpretation. Baude and Paulsen seem to avoid this underlying debate over methodology, asserting an originalist approach from the outset and proceeding from there. (see, e.g., pp. 8-9). But the possibilities of alternate methodologies should at least qualify assertions that considerations beyond original meaning are "simply wrong."

One might object to my highlighting debate over alternate theories of constitutional interpretation by arguing that the majority of Supreme Court Justices are originalists, and that it therefore makes sense to take as given that the Court will employ an originalist method in interpreting Section Three (should the issue make its way to them). Paulsen, at least, seems to express such a view in his first interview with Amar, going so far as to suggest that the Court may side 9-0 in favor of Trump's in eligibility (with the originalist justices following the article, and the three liberal justices taking an approach more in line with Ramsey's "intuitive assessment" approach). 

I'm not as convinced. The Court's approach to originalism tends to be inconsistent at best, including in recent cases that many commentators mistakenly describe as originalist decisions. I suspect that some of the more conservative justices may be at least tempted to give in to political leanings. I also suspect that these leanings may join in a coalition with institutional concerns that prompt the Court to avoid ruling that Trump is disqualified out of a fear of political backlash. All of this should give pause to assumptions that the Court will embrace interpretive principles above politics.

But say we set aside the meta-theoretical debate and accept an originalist approach to interpretation. Even then, consequences of that method still may play a role in the overall interpretive process. Considerations beyond the text frequently play a role in interpretation when the text to be interpreted is broad, undefined, or otherwise capable of multiple meanings. In choosing how to give effect to that text--say, in selecting one of multiple potential meanings, including original meanings--judges may opt for an interpretation that has better consequences or, if the case involves invalidating a law, leaving the law in place out of deference to the democratic process. 

We can make the description of the process a bit more precise by distinguishing between linguistic meaning and legal meaning. Lawrence Solum does so in distinguishing the initial step of "interpretation" (deriving the linguistic meaning of a provision) from "construction" (giving legal effect to that meaning). Perhaps Baude and Paulsen have a stronger argument that consequences don't play a role in that first step of interpretation. But even then, I'm not sure if this is right, or if it matters. The possibility remains that a theory of interpretation (that does not account for consequences) may lead to multiple meanings, including broader and narrower interpretations in the Section Three context. Sure, we may be able to narrow things down to a smaller range of potential meanings using interpretation. But the entire debate may still center around which of those meanings ought to be accepted by actors tasked with putting interpretation into effect.

And that's the debate that Baude and Paulsen have chosen to enter. For one, their argument quoted above critiques how Chase "construe[d]" Section Three--strongly suggesting they're talking about how the language is constructed. But more fundamentally, they cannot simply dismiss the process in which semantic meaning translates to legal action through government action (whether by state secretaries of states or judges). After all, they've written an article that expresses conclusions regarding what Section Three requires of modern actors, and they therefore must take all considerations into account--both at the initial stage of determining the meaning of words on a page, to the next stage of how those meanings ought to be put into effect by legal actors.

I suspect the response to this is that the original semantic meaning of Section Three is so determinate (or, "thick,") that there's no need for construction. As noted at the outset, I'm not here to argue against Baude and Paulsen on their historical points, and they've done a great deal of legwork to set forth their argument. In making this argument, I assume that Baude and Paulsen have done a thorough job of canvassing the history, amassing the argument, and providing support for their conclusions.

Even so, proving a semantic meaning that is so thick that consequentialist arguments may simply be swept beside is a tall order. Remember, construction may be required where there are multiple potential original meanings. These multiple meanings may result from the inquiry originalism requires, which involves surveying a wide range of detailed, sometimes contradictory historical accounts. It may not be certain what the original meaning was from such an investigation. Alternatively, multiple meanings may be what the interpretive inquiry turns up. A thorough examination of the historical evidence may reveal that, at the time of ratification, people held different beliefs about the meaning of Section Three. 

To be sure, one may decide to go with what appears to be the most common meaning, or to avoid meanings that only seemed to exist in certain camps (say, critics of the Fourteenth Amendment, or only people with certain expertise). But this move of selecting between alternate meanings is itself a form of construction. And the question then becomes: why allow this form of construction, while dismissing alternative forms of construction that take into account the consequences of one interpretation over another?

Baude and Paulsen must address this question as critics continue to raise concerns over the practical implications of their arguments. Thus far, their move seems to be to distinguish their interpretive arguments from consequential considerations--considerations that they claim are irrelevant to the core interpretive inquiry. The discussion above, though, suggests why this may not be the case even if Baude and Paulsen have made a strong originalist showing.

As a final note in this already lengthy post, I do not rule out the possibility of other interpretive methods reaching the same conclusion as Baude and Paulsen. McConnell raises consequentialist concerns in one direction, but the consequences of a minimal reading of Section Three in the face of such flagrant misconduct by Trump may undermine fundamental qualifications for office in the short and long term that may outweigh potential abuse of the provision. And interpretive methods beyond originalism or pragmatism may also get to the same result. I confess that my political preferences align me with Baude and Paulsen's conclusions about disqualification, as I think that Trump's conduct is reprehensible and should dissuade any reasonable voter from supporting him. But it's still worth delving into the assumptions underlying the constitutional interpretation dimension of the debate, even if doing so might cast doubt on conclusions I find agreeable.