Connecticut Legislature to Consider Ban on "Distracted Walking"

The Hartford Courant reports on a "Distracted Walking" law that is making its way through Connecticut's legislature. From the report:

The General Assembly’s transportation committee was voting Wednesday on a bill that would make it a fineable offense to cross the street while looking at your cellphone.

“This is really about trying to protect the person who should be aware when they’re putting themselves in front of a two or three ton vehicle barreling at them … if they’re not paying attention they will lose that battle,” said Sen. Carlo Leone, D-Stamford and co-chair of the committee.

Rep. Roland Lemar, D-New Haven and the committee’s other co-chair, said he started out opposing the bill, reasoning that walkers “present the least danger” in terms of causing traffic accidents.

“As I heard from more and more people, this is a shared responsibility that we have,” he said. “We do have things like distracted driving, so distracted walking is a reasonable standard that we should establish.”

The bill is S.B. No. 825 and can be found here. The bill is of note because it is, to my knowledge, the first state-level legislation that would restrict the use of electronic devices while walking across streets. A few towns have passed restrictions like this, but I am not aware of any states that have done so.

From the text of the bill:

Section 1. (NEW) (Effective October 1, 2019) (a) For the purposes of this section, "mobile electronic device" means any hand-held or other portable electronic equipment capable of providing data communication between two or more persons, including, but not limited to, a mobile telephone, a text messaging device, a paging device, a personal digital assistant, a laptop computer, equipment that is capable of playing a video game or a digital video disk, or equipment on which digital photographs are taken or transmitted, or any combination thereof, and "viewing" means looking in the direction of the screen of a mobile electronic device.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, no pedestrian shall cross a highway while viewing a mobile electronic device.

(c) The provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall not apply to (1) the use of a mobile electronic device for the sole purpose of communicating with any of the following regarding an emergency situation: An emergency response operator, a hospital, physician's office or health clinic, an ambulance company, a fire department or a police department, or (2) any of the following persons while in the performance of their official duties and within the scope of their employment: A peace officer or firefighter, as those terms are defined in section 53a-3 of the general statutes, or any emergency medical responder, emergency medical technician or paramedic, as those terms are defined in section 19a-175 of the general statutes.

(d) Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall, for a first violation, receive a warning and, for any subsequent violation, be fined twenty dollars.

This restriction is narrower than Honolulu's ban (examined in painstaking detail here). Connecticut's proposed restriction applies to a smaller range of devices, as it includes the important qualification that a "mobile electronic device" affected by the bill must be capable of providing data communication between two or more persons. Honolulu's ban, on the other hand, applied to devices that either provided for communications between two or more people OR were capable of "providing amusement." This means that even if someone is fiddling with an iPod while crossing the street, they will not violate this law, provided that their iPod is a model that cannot send messages or texts to other people. Of course, it seems that no one (including me, for the most part) listens to music on anything other than their phones while walking anymore, but now there may be a reason to dust off the old devices.

Unlike Montclair, California's terribly-drafted ban, the Connecticut bill only applies to instances where pedestrians are "viewing" the device, which the bill defines as "looking in the direction of the screen of a mobile electronic device." Honolulu uses a similar definition. This is narrower than Montclair's ban, which also applies to listening to devices with headphones.

As I've noted before, I generally oppose restrictions like this. Bills that prohibit common practices like this are likely to be unequally enforced in light of widespread violations will occur, and enforcement will be left up to the discretion of law enforcement officers. Broad grants of discretion like this are likely to disproportionately impact racial minorities, the poor, and others who officers believe are "suspicious." While this bill isn't as broad as Montclair's ban, it is still more than is necessary. And, as I've also noted before, while proponents of the bill may argue that its twenty-dollar fine is low, this amount is still burdensome to some and it can add up for those who are repeatedly cited -- a likely occurrence for a prohibition on common activity.

And as for Rep. Roland Lemar's change of heart on the bill in light of restrictions on distracted driving, this ignores the fact that pedestrians are not the ones who are likely to cause harm to others if they are walking while distracted. Distracted driving rules make sense, as vehicles can cause significant injury or death if their drivers aren't paying attention. As for people who are walking, they may well end up injured if they are walking while distracted, but they are not going to injure others like distracted drivers. That Lemar cannot recognize this distinction is unsettling.

As for the status of the bill, on March 20, 2019, the Transportation Committee voted in favor of the bill, and as of today, the bill has been submitted to the Legislative Commissioner's Office. From there, it may be voted on by the legislature or it may proceed to a different committee (at least, that's what I've been able to grasp from this cheat sheet on Connecticut legislative procedure). Hopefully the bill will be referred to another committee to die, or the legislature will vote against it, as it is an unnecessary restriction that may prompt other states and towns to follow suit.

Can a Map Maker be Sued for Nuisance?

In a recent post I discussed whether one could sue a map maker for nuisance. For example, say a map maker were to write on a widely-distributed map that a particular house on a street corner was ugly and that people should heckle it. This would appear to constitute a nuisance under section 822 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which states:

One is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, but only if, his conduct is a legal cause of an invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion is either 

(a) intentional and unreasonable, or 

(b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules controlling liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous conditions or activities.

After a bit of digging, I found one case that involves a lawsuit for nuisance based on a map. While not identical to my hypothetical, it is close enough to be noteworthy, and is the only case of its kind of which I am aware. The case is Figlar v. Edwards, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2897 (Conn. Super Ct. 2000), and it is an unreported superior court decision from Connecticut. A publicly accessible version of the opinion is here.

The relevant facts and nuisance analysis are as follows:

The present case arises from the flooding of a parcel of property. The most recent complaint is in four counts, the first of which sounds in negligence, the second in reckless and wanton misconduct, the third in nuisance and the fourth in misrepresentation. The defendant moves to strike the second, third and fourth claims as well as two prayers for relief. 

John Figlar and John G. Howell purchased the property in question. The defendant, Larry Edwards, doing business as Larry Edwards Associates, allegedly provided "surveying and engineering services commencing from on or about August of 1991 up to and including October 1997 to the property, realtors, contractors, the planning and zoning commission of the town of Newtown, the plaintiffs and other general contractors and/or their agents and/or their advisors for purposes of developing said property . . ." The defendant subsequently filed a resubdivision map with the Newtown town clerk. 

In October 1997, Figlar and Howell commenced construction on the property and engaged the services of the defendant to design and layout the septic system in reliance on the defendant's survey. Subsequently, the septic system and the property flooded because the defendant either failed to find, or failed to indicate, that a storm water drainage system passed on, over and through the subject property.
. . .

As to the third count of the complaint which alleges, in relevant part, that: "9. The defendant, Larry Edwards, failed to disclose and/or depict the drainage easement upon the resubdivision map and that failure has a natural tendency to create a danger of flooding, damage and injury to the plaintiff property owners and the general public in the surrounding area. 10. The defendant's failure to depict this storm water drainage system on the resubdivision map created the continued and repeated dangers of flooding and damages to the plaintiffs' property and the surrounding areas. 11. The defendant, Larry Edwards, was charged to create an accurate resubdivision map of the subject area and he failed, despite knowledge to the contrary, to depict the storm water drainage system upon his resubdivision map. 12. This violation of the A-2 survey requirements and the inaccuracies of the defendant, Larry Edwards, violated the general public's rights to accurate and professional information contained in the recorded public maps and therefore also produced a common injury to the plaintiffs and the general public who relied upon him to properly depict said water drainage system and thereby allow for proper and reasonable development of land and prevention of damages and floodings." 

Both parties characterize this count as one sounding in public and private nuisance. A cause of action for private nuisance has four elements: "(1) the condition complained of had a natural tendency to create danger and inflict injury upon person or property; (2) the danger created was a continuing one; (3) the use of the land was unreasonable or unlawful; (4) the existence of the nuisance was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries and damages." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Walsh v. Stonington Water Pollution Control Authority, 250 Conn. 443, 449 n.4, 736 A.2d 811 (1999). In order to allege a public nuisance, a plaintiff must also allege the additional element that "the condition or conduct complained of interfered with a right common to the general public." Id., 459 n.9. 

The defendant asserts that because there is no allegation that the defendant owned, controlled and/or utilized any piece of land in an unreasonable fashion, the plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action in either public or private nuisance. The plaintiffs claim that it was the maps that were the nuisance causing property. They fail to cite any authority, and the court is aware of none, for the novel argument that nuisance liability extends to those who have ownership or control over a map. The court agrees with the defendant that the plaintiffs fail to allege a necessary element of either public or private nuisance, as they do not allege that the defendant caused them any harm by way of unreasonable use of real property.

Connecticut nuisance law appears to have the added element that a defendant's conduct relate to the defendant's use of land. Accordingly, a defendant who interferes with another's enjoyment of property in some manner that does not involve the use of land cannot be liable for nuisance.

Under the Restatement definition of nuisance, however, I suspect that the Figlar plaintiff may have a viable cause of action. The Restatement does not require that the defendant own or use land in a certain manner, and if the plaintiff's allegations are correct, the defendants may well be liable for their failure to disclose a drainage easement if it results in damage to the plaintiff's property.

Sachs on State Drone Regulations

Peter Sachs, a lawyer and notable commentator on drone laws, has posted his testimony (available to download here) where he argues against regulating both government drones and private drones. At this time, I am not sure where he gave this testimony, but based on prior events, I suspect that this may be testimony for the Connecticut state legislature's Judiciary Committee. Sachs has taken a strong position against drone restrictions in prior testimony before that committee.

I do not have much to say about Sachs's points on regulating private drones. I agree that overly restrictive regulation of private drones could hinder the development of this new technology in unpredictable ways. And I think that privacy concerns related to drone use are generally overstated and can be addressed by other laws prohibiting invasion of privacy.

But I take issue with a few of Sachs's arguments against regulating government drones. Sachs argues that there is no logical need for warrants on government drones and points out that high-powered cameras in helicopters can see far more than a government drone can see. I think this fails to address the main concern of privacy advocates, which is that drones can be used for prolonged surveillance of somebody's public movements or of somebody's home.

Drones require less fuel to operate, can be launched more conveniently, and are easier to fly than a helicopter, meaning that law enforcement officers may use this technology for continuous surveillance. The fear is not that drones will necessarily see more detail than helicopters, but that they can observe somebody's home or movements for a much longer time. Sachs needs to address this particular concern in order to meet the arguments of privacy advocates.

Sachs also argues that "there is no legal need" to require law enforcement agencies to obtain warrants before using drones, Sachs is probably (though not certainly) correct that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches does not apply to aerial observations of one's property, and cites case law supporting that conclusion.

But just because continuous observation by government drones does not violate the Fourth Amendment doesn't mean that governments should not place regulations that go beyond existing constitutional protections. In fact, the Fourth Amendment's inability to regulate government drones is what motivates privacy advocates to argue for legislative restrictions in the first place. State legislatures are free to enact laws that restrict government searches beyond the restrictions of the federal constitution. And as I argue elsewhere, the interests of both privacy advocates and law enforcement would be best served if legislatures, rather than courts, were tasked with restricting government drone use.

Sachs raises some good points about government regulation of drones. But his arguments fail to address privacy advocates' concerns that government drones may be used for continuous surveillance.