Voisine and the Significance of Second Amendment Silence

The Supreme Court released an opinion today in Voisine v. United States (full opinion here), a case described by Rory Little of SCOTUSblog as both "arcane" and "unremarkable." But the case involves guns and statutory interpretation, so here I am writing about it.

Voisine concerns 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(9) which prohibits those who have previously been convicted of a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" from possessing firearms.  18 U.S.C. §921(a)(33)(A) defines the Section 922(g)(9) prohibition to encompass anybody previously convicted of a misdemeanor against a domestic relation that necessarily involves "the use or attempted use of physical force."  The question before the Court: whether Voisine's prior conviction for misdemeanor assault against his girlfriend in violation of Section 207 of the Maine Criminal Code constituted "the use or attempted use of physical force" under the federal law.  Section 207 of the Maine Criminal Code prohibits a person from "intentionally, knowingly or recklessly caus[ing] bodily injury or offensive physical contact to another person." The central issue: whether "reckless" use of force is sufficient to constitute a prior use of force, or whether the prior crime had to involve knowing or intentional use of force.

In this post, I will first explore Voisine's quirky background, then outline the statutory arguments that constituted the bulk of the Majority and Dissenting opinions. I then turn to the Second Amendment issue, which rears its head only in Justice Thomas's solo dissent, and explore whether the Court's silence on this issue signals how it may address future cases with potential Second Amendment questions.