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Wednesday, July 12, 2023

Original Meaning, Context, and Shifting Reference Points: The Racial Connotations of "Freedmen"

At the Atlantic, Adam Serwer critiques Justice Thomas's analysis of the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause in the Court's Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College opinion. Specifically, Serwer takes issue with Thomas's claim that the term "freedmen" was racially neutral. Michael Rappaport, whose work Thomas cites in support of this claim, calls out Serwer, labeling his article as a "screed" rife with mistakes. Rappaport then argues that the term "freedmen" is race-neutral and ought to be read as referring to former slaves rather than Black people.

Below, I set out the arguments, starting with Justice Thomas, moving to Serwer, and concluding with Rappaport. I then demonstrate the flaws in Rappaport's response (and, in turn, Thomas's reasoning)--arguing that his arguments only succeed by sidestepping context necessary to determine original meaning and using shifting definitional reference points to avoid arguments about original meaning.

Setting the Stage

In SFFA v. Harvard, the Court struck down Harvard's and the University of North Carolina's affirmative action programs. In doing so, the Court concluded that the types of programs employed were inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. While the majority's treatment of the Fourteenth Amendment's history and original meaning was relatively brief, Justice Thomas authored a lengthy concurrence purporting to demonstrate the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause and why affirmative action programs are inconsistent with the clause.

In doing so, Justice Thomas defends a "colorblind" version of equal protection, drawing repeatedly on Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson. Here's one example of how Justice Thomas quotes Harlan:
For Justice Harlan, the Constitution was colorblind and categorically rejected laws designed to protect “a dominant race—a superior class of citizens,” while imposing a “badge of servitude” on others. (p. 17)

For what it's worth, here's how Justice Harlan discussed the Constitution's colorblindness:

The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.

To very quickly summarize: the colorblind approach to equal protection is important to Justice Thomas (and the majority) because they read the Equal Protection Clause as a blanket ban on any racial distinctions in law. This applies not only to laws that disadvantage or denigrate people on the basis of race, but also laws that are designed to provide benefits to people on the basis of race. A strict, colorblind reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of "the equal protection of the laws," therefore prohibits affirmative action programs, which increase the probability of admission for certain applicants on the basis of race.

In arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment's original meaning supports such a reading, one obstacle Thomas confronts is that of laws providing particular benefits and protections to "freedmen," or former slaves, enacted around the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's enactment and ratification. The argument with which Thomas contends is that laws like the 1865 and 1866 Freedmen's Bureau Acts provided benefits to freedmen, and therefore provided benefits on the basis of race. This undermines an originalist reading that the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to be neutral above all else by demonstrating that the same Congress that voted for the Fourteenth Amendment also enacted laws containing racial classifications.

Thomas rejects this reading of the Freedmen's Bureau Acts:

Importantly, however, the Acts applied to freedmen (and refugees), a formally race-neutral category, not blacks writ large. And, because “not all blacks in the United States were former slaves,” “ ‘freedman’ ” was a decidedly underinclusive proxy for race. M. Rappaport, Originalism and the Colorblind Constitution, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 71, 98 (2013) (Rappaport). Moreover, the Freedmen’s Bureau served newly freed slaves alongside white refugees. P. Moreno, Racial Classifications and Reconstruction Legislation, 61 J. So. Hist. 271, 276–277 (1995); R. Barnett & E. Bernick, The Original Meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment 119 (2021). And, advocates of the law explicitly disclaimed any view rooted in modern conceptions of antisubordination. To the contrary, they explicitly clarified that the equality sought by the law was not one in which all men shall be “six feet high”; rather, it strove to ensure that freedmen enjoy “equal rights before the law” such that “each man shall have the right to pursue in his own way life, liberty, and happiness.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 322, 342.
In his Atlantic article, Serwer rejects this argument:
“Freedmen” cannot be a “formally race-neutral category,” because American slavery was not a formally race-neutral institution. Moreover, an extensive historical record illuminates the intentions of the lawmakers who passed the Freedmen’s Bureau Acts. They certainly did not see the term freedmen as racially neutral, and they intended the bureau to protect the rights of Black people in the South, whether formerly enslaved or not. We know this because they said so; the insistence to the contrary is the result of conservatives projecting their version of “color blindness” backwards through time.
Serwer goes on to argue that ninety percent of Black people were slaves in 1860, citing an email exchange with historian Eric Foner. He also points to evidence that supporters of the Freedmen's Bureau Acts, those who debated them, and Justice Thomas himself use the terms "freedmen" and "blacks" independently. These arguments align with points made by Justice Sotomayor in her dissent (pp. 6-8) where she also notes that "contemporaries understood that the Freedmen's Bureau Act benefited Black people" and that the same congress that passed the Act also passed the Fourteenth Amendment.

At The Originalism Blog, Mike Rappaport takes issue with Serwer, arguing that Serwer manages to "include both the main mistakes historians make about the Freedmen’s Bureau Acts and some of the principal slanders against modern originalism." Rappaport also chides Serwer for failing to read his law review article, "Originalism and the Colorblind Constitution," which Thomas cites in his concurrence (a citation included in the quoted excerpt of Thomas's concurrence).

Rappaport argues that Serwer fails to defeat the originalist case for a race-neutral reading of the Equal Protection Clause, focusing on evidence regarding the Freedmen's Bureau Acts:
If Serwer wants to prove his point, he needs to claim that freedmen meant blacks rather than former slaves. But that is pretty difficult, given that the term “freedmen” pretty clearly indicates someone who used to be a slave and has now been freed. Serwer quotes a couple of historians to claim otherwise but their arguments miss the point. For example, Serwer quotes an Eric Foner email stating “Ninety percent of Blacks were slaves in 1860, and everyone knew whom the Freedom Bureau Act was meant to assist.” But that is not the question. The question is whether "freedmen" referred to people based on their color or based on circumstances.
Serwer’s principal argument is that all freedmen were black. True enough, but irrelevant. The question is whether "freedmen" was a category that selected people based on race. It does not. Not all blacks were freedmen. Some had been born free. (And there were no whites, who were former slaves, who were not treated as freedmen.) The Act identifies a category based on circumstances, not race. 

Is the Original Meaning of "Freedmen" Race-Neutral?

With this extensive stage-setting finally done, it's worth taking a step back to look at what it is Thomas and Rappaport are trying to prove. Both zero in on the textual meaning of "freedmen" to advance their points. But it's worth keeping in mind that the meaning of "freedmen" is secondary--the ultimate goal here is how the term "freedmen" informs the meaning of "equal protection of the laws" in the Fourteenth Amendment.

How does this argument function? Those like Serwer and Sotomayor contend that if "freedmen" is not racially-neutral, then laws that explicitly benefit freedmen are therefore laws that provide a benefit based on race. The Freedmen's Bureau Act doesn't involve the exact same terminology of "Equal Protection," but the implication is that if it is not racially neutral, then it provides context for understanding the meaning of other language approved of by the same enacting body. In short, a strict, race-neutral reading of equal protection doesn't make sense if enacted by a Congress that also enacted race-based benefit schemes.

Rappaport and Thomas zoom in on terms and technical definitions to advance their race-neutral reading. Rappaport's point in his blog is a good distilled version of the arguments he makes in his article, and Thomas's reasoning is an even briefer version of the points. "Freedmen" isn't a racial term because not all Black people were slaves (Rappaport does acknowledge in his article that 89 percent of Black people at the time of the Civil War were slaves, and that, of the remaining 11 percent, "some, of course, were former slaves") (p. 98 n.108).

Through this exchange, it's important to track what reference points the parties are employing in defining the term, "freedmen." Serwer and Sotomayor appear to be arguing from an original intent (and, potentially, a limited original public meaning) approach. The meaning of "freedmen," at least as understood among those debating and enacting the Fourteenth Amendment and Freedmen's Bureau Acts, was not race-neutral. Accordingly, a law providing benefits based on freedmen status is a race-based classification. Rappaport purports to respond to this argument, but does so by employing a different reference point: the dictionary definition of "freedmen" as "formerly enslaved person"--a definition which, in turn, does not apply to all Black people (as a small percentage of Black people had not been enslaved). Rappaport seizes on this definitional to argue that the term is therefore race-neutral. But this is unconvincing. 

First, this argument requires one to look past the sheer proportion of Black people who fit into the "freedman" category and the fact that all people in the "freedmen" category were Black. All of this provides valuable context for what those using "freedmen" at the time of the enactment of the Freedmen's Bureau Acts and the Fourteenth Amendment meant: that "freedmen" was a racialized term used to refer to Black people. This is the point Serwer makes when he notes that those in the 39th Congress, and Justice Thomas himself, use "freedmen" interchangeably with "Blacks" and "negroes."

And context is important when determining original meaning. After all, this entire debate over the meaning of "freedmen" is taking place because the meaning of the Freedmen's Bureau Acts provides contextual evidence for or against a race-neutral reading of "equal protection" in the Fourteenth Amendment. It therefore seems quite strange to admit contextual evidence like the Freedmen's Bureau Acts to determine the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, while overlooking contextual evidence of the racial makeup freedmen and the low percentage of Black non-freedmen when attempting to sort out the original meaning of "freedmen."

Second, by changing his reference point, Rappaport does not engage with what Serwer and Sotomayor are discussing: the original understanding of the "freedmen" by those in Congress (and potentially the public). In the context of this debate, and most originalist analysis, it is this type of definition--not strained dictionary manipulation--that is characteristic of the original meaning that ought to be employed in the final analysis. Serwer and Sotomayor argue on this level. Rappaport (and for the most part Thomas) do not.

As a result, Rappaport's response fails to engage with Serwer's argument, which relies on context and the understanding of those enacting the Freedmen's Bureau Acts and the Fourteenth Amendment--context and understanding that, despite "freedmen's" dictionary definition of "freed slave," imbues the term with racial meaning. Instead, Rappaport's response falls back on dictionary definitions and notions of inclusiveness, technical points that he fails to connect with the understanding of those in Congress or the general public at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted.

Rappaport suggests that Serwer failed to consult his law review article, so let's not make that mistake. In his article, it looks like Rappaport comes closer to addressing Serwer's point:

Second, while as a formal matter freedmen is not a racial term, it obviously has a strong connection and overlap with race. Thus, even if one does not treat the term as racial, one would still want to closely examine whether the term was being secretly used for racial purposes. There is, however, no reason to believe that the term freedmen was being used in this manner. There is an obvious reason why the Congress might have passed these Acts that has nothing to do with the race of the former slaves. These slaves had been oppressed in the most extensive way and had not received a basic education or learned the trade skills necessary to live self-sufficiently. Moreover, not only did they lack human capital, they also had acquired no physical capital in the form of land or money. Thus, it made perfect sense to provide them with education, food, shelter, and land in order to allow people who had been uniquely oppressed to enter society as free individuals. Further, even if one did not believe that these goods and services were needed to allow the former slaves to live self-sufficiently, one might argue that the benefits could be justified as a limited form of compensation for the harms these slaves had suffered.

Here, however, Rappaport still fails to engage with original meaning and context. Rappaport's initial recognition of the "strong connection and overlap with race" that the term "freedmen" quickly devolves into an inquiry over whether the term was being "secretly used for racial purposes." At this point, Rappaport has already left the debate. Assuming secrecy and subterfuge also assumes that the term, "freedmen" wasn't generally understood to have racial connotations--the point that Rappaport is supposed to be disproving. There is no secret, as using the term "freedmen" in a law is evidence enough that one is making a race-based classification.

From here, Rappaport's line of argument continues afield. He argues that there were reasons other than race to use the term "freedman." These former slaves hadn't received a basic education, they lacked human capital, they had no money or shelter. It's because of these conditions of slavery--not race, that they deserve special treatment.

This line of argumentation misses the point for two reasons. First, Rappaport's resort to the reasons for why Congress passed acts targeting freedmen fail to delve into why freedmen were enslaved and therefore lacked land, money, education, and other resources. They were enslaved because of their race. Accordingly, these alternative reasons remain inextricably connected with race. 

Second, as flagged above, the notion that there's a "secret" effort to target race begs the question by assuming that "freedmen" is not a racial term. But as Serwer argues, and as Rappaport appears to acknowledge at the beginning of this paragraph, "freedmen" is a racial term. In context--in a nation where slavery had just ended, where all the slaves were Black, and where the vast majority of Black people were former slaves--the term "freedmen" has racial connotations. The definitional parsing and claims of underinclusiveness do not engage with this contextual point. As with the previous line of argumentation, the resort to underinclusiveness claims is an unexplained and unwarranted abandonment of the relevant context and fails to refer back to original meaning.

The overall goal of this post was to lay out why it is that Rappaport's arguments appear unconvincing. His point may seem off at the outset, but without parsing out the different reference points involved in the debate and Rappaport's shift to dictionary definitions while purporting to describe original understanding, it may not be clear why precisely Rappaport's arguments fail to land.

The Implications of "Refugees"

This post is already too long, so why not make it just a bit longer? Both Thomas and Rappaport (in his article, at least) argue that the Freedmen's Bureau Acts also provided benefits for "refugees"--a term that both Rappaport and Thomas suggest mainly referred to white people. Thomas's argument on this point is short and fails to explain the significance of the point: "Moreover, the Freedmen's Bureau served newly freed slaves alongside white refugees." Rappaport's argument is more detailed:

Third, the bulk of the provisions under the Freedmen's Bureau Acts provided benefits to both freedmen and refugees. The term refugees would normally include whites, and once it is recognized that virtually all southern blacks would be freedmen, refugees becomes a term that would appear to have been intended mainly to cover whites. If one were concerned that the use of freedmen was an attempt to provide benefits on racial grounds, then the inclusion of refugees should help to quiet that concern. One question that one must ask about a category that overlaps with race is whether that nonracial category is being used as a subterfuge to benefit or harm a race. If the Acts merely provided benefits to freedmen, even though non-blacks were similarly in need of the same benefits, then one might be suspicious of the omission. By contrast, if the benefit is extended to non-blacks in a similar position, there is far less concern of it being a secretive attempt to provide racial benefits. I am skeptical that refugees really were similarly situated to former slaves, but if one did think so, this would quiet that concern. Moreover, there is evidence in the legislative history that refugees were added in part because of concerns that the proposed legislation was seen by some as race-based.

While Rappaport's treatment of refugee benefits is longer than Thomas's, it's still unclear how this proves the point that benefits provided to freedmen weren't benefits provided on racial grounds. Rappaport appears to acknowledge that this point has no bearing on the racial connotations of "freedmen," now acknowledging that all freedmen are Black and suggesting that benefit provision to refugees therefore applies mainly to white people. At the same time, Rappaport continues to argue as though providing benefits to Black people is being attempted via subterfuge--a tactic that (as noted above) assumes the conclusion that "freedmen" was originally understood to be race-neutral. The most apparent issue is that even if "refugee" is a race-neutral term, it's unclear how what bearing its neutrality has on the separate term, "freedmen."

It appears that Rappaport is arguing that the Freedmen Bureau's Act, by providing benefits to refugees, balances out the allocation of benefits "to non-blacks in a similar position" and therefore balances out the provision of benefits to white people and Black people. His final sentence supports this reading, where he notes that there's evidence that "refugees were added in part because of concerns that the proposed legislation was seen by some as race-based."

But if this is the point Rappaport is making, it only succeeds if one assumes the opposite of what Rappaport is attempting to prove, that providing benefits to "freedmen" is the provision of benefits on the basis of race. If including refugees as a separate category of beneficiaries is necessary to accomplish racial neutrality, then any benefit specifically provided to freedmen is a benefit provided on the basis of race. Indeed, from a racial classification perspective, this seems to be even more problematic for Rappaport's colorblind vision, as this reading characterizes the Act as counteracting one racial classification with a second, separate racial classification. 

Problems arise further to the extent that benefits were allocated differently between refugees and freedmen. Eric Schnapper details this differentiated treatment, highlighting "four race-conscious provisions" in the Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1866, including a different scope of overall aid to be provided to freedmen as opposed to refugees, a limitation of the use of land and buildings for education to freedmen only, and certain land protections for freedmen only." (p. 772-73). 

Ultimately, this point is secondary, and gets fairly short shrift in Thomas's opinion. But it's worth mentioning to the extent that it further demonstrates Rappaport's shifting and lack of clarity regarding definitional reference points.

There is much more to discuss regarding the Court's opinion, Thomas's concurrence, and even the original meaning of freedmen. But this post is now far longer than reason demands, and I will leave it to the reader to seek out commentary on those other points elsewhere. I'm sure, as the weeks and months go on, much more will be said.

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