Drunken Longshoremen and Statutory Interpretation

Shaun Martin posts at the California Appellate Report about the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Schwirse v. OCWP.

Martin’s post focuses on the facts of the case, so I will not repeat them here in depth.  The main takeaways are: (1) Schwirse, a drunken longshoreman, fell at work and is seeking reimbursement for his injury, arguing that his injury was not "occasioned solely" by his intoxication, (2) contrary to everything I have heard over the past two years, law may not be the drunkest profession, and (3) the timeless warning that you should not drink beer before whiskey has gained yet another supporting anecdote.

I (bore that I am) want to add a comment on the issue of statutory interpretation present in this case.  This case involves “LHWCA” which serves a double function as: (1) the acronym for the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act and (2) what Schwirse probably said when he fell six feet onto a concrete and steel ledge while relieving himself.  The LHWCA presumes that longshoremen are due compensation for injuries suffered on the job, but there is a clever exception: this presumption does not exist if there is substantial evidence that the injury was occasioned solely by the intoxication of the injured employee. 

Schwirse advanced the ingenious argument his injury was not occasioned solely by his intoxication.  While his intoxication caused his accident (the fall), the injury (a lacerated scalp) was caused by his colliding with the concrete ledge.  While the alcohol played a role, it was not the sole cause of the injury. 

The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, noting that this interpretation would render the LHWCA’s intoxication exception “insignificant, if not wholly superfluous.”  In light of the various perils a drunken longshoreman would face on the docks, I am leaning towards the “wholly superfluous” conclusion.

As a final remark on the case, I think that law students everywhere would be better off if this case were added to statutory interpretation casebooks to illustrate the principle that statutes should be interpreted in a manner that avoids rendering portions of the statute superfluous.  Somebody should also tell Justice Scalia, in case he wants to release a second edition of Reading Law.